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Abstract:  
 
The European law of cross-border cooperation is the legal product of the interplay of different 
legal orders, namely the international public legal order (Madrid Outline Convention, following 
Protocols and international agreements enforcing it), the European Union and the national one. 
To this extent, the European law of CBC is a dynamic process where each of the three components 
plays a role but none is prevailing from a normative point of view. 
 
The paper examines the components of this European law of CBC by looking first at the way 
CBC is currently conceived by the supranational legal drivers (Council of Europe and EU). It 
emerges that CBC is not more a matter of dealing with the problems of proximity between 
communities and territories laying on either side of borders, but of putting together genuine 
projects for CBC area and implementing a real CBC policy. This implies some consequences. 
First, CBC as a policy tends to involve territorial units enjoying influential political capacity, 
such as: federal state, legislative regions or at least inter-municipal association. Even national 
state may have an interest in participating. The second feature is the institutionalization of CBC 
as a way to promote coordination of policies, even according to a multilevel governance concept, 
rather than as an instrument to solve specific cross-border problems. 
 
However, this conception of CBC and its consequences must be put into relation with the attitude 
national states have showed towards CBC. By taking into consideration some factors – namely, 
the type of decentralization, the intergovernmental relations, the ethnic minorities presence, the 
influence exerted by supranational actors in countries of democratic transition – we will 
investigate the potential degree of the national states’ acceptability of the common regulatory 
solution advanced at the supranational level. To this extent, some specific references will be made 
to the national enforcement process of the EGTC Regulation in order to enlighten and 
understand why the EGTC application across Europe is likely to vary. 
 
 
 VOLUME 4       EJLS   ISSUE 1 
 152 
 
ESSAY 
 
HARMONIZING TRENDS VS DOMESTIC REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS:  
LOOKING FOR THE EUROPEAN LAW ON CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 
 
DAVIDE STRAZZARI* 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 152 
2. The Harmonizing Trends: Council of Europe and EU Involvement in CBC............. 156 
2.1 The Council of Europe Acquis on CBC ......................................................................... 157 
2.2 Interstate international agreements on CBC in Europe........................................... 162 
2.2.1 Why Concluding bi- or multilateral treaties on CBC? .................................... 162 
2.2.2 The Setting Up of a CBC Body: from Episodic to Systemic CBC ................. 164 
2.2.3 New actors for CBC?................................................................................................ 167 
2.3 The EU Role in CBC: from Financing to Legal Regulation ................................... 170 
3. The Role of the National State in the European Law of CBC ........................................ 175 
3.1 Types of Decentralization ............................................................................................... 176 
3.2 Intergovernmental Relations.......................................................................................... 179 
3.3 Ethnic Minorities .............................................................................................................. 185 
3.4 Supranational conditionality and CBC in countries in Transition: the Case of 
Central Eastern Europe .......................................................................................................... 188 
4. An attempt of classification of the national practices by looking at empirical cases of 
CBC ................................................................................................................................................... 192 
4.1 ―Soft promotional‖ national states ................................................................................. 192 
4.2 ―Strongly promotional‖ national states ........................................................................ 194 
4.3 ―Reluctant‖ national states .............................................................................................. 196 
5. Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................................ 198 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Currently, one of the most prominent features of the European legal landscape is the 
interaction between national, European Union and international-regional legal orders. 
While the interrelations between national and EU legal orders are a well-established 
phenomenon, the influence played by the Council of Europe legal interventions on both 
national and EU legal orders is becoming more and more relevant, mostly due to the 
                                               
* Researcher in Comparative Public Law, University of Trento, Faculty of Sociology. The paper is a 
product of the research the author has conducted within the research project ―Crossplan - Institutional 
Solutions for Cross-border Strategic Planning‖ awarded funding from the Autonomous Province of 
Trento. © Davide Strazzari. 
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and the increased judicial activity of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
Cross-border cooperation (CBC) 1 is another field, certainly less sensitive than the 
protection of human rights, where a similar interaction between legal orders emerges in 
such a way that it is possible to speak of a European law of CBC. 
 
To this extent, it is difficult to define what the European law of CBC is in positive legal 
terms since the notion aims more to highlight the idea of CBC as a dynamic process 
where all the three mentioned legal orders – namely the international, the EU and the 
national one – have a normative role but none of them is prevailing.  
 
In fact, CBC is not international, in the sense it is not an exercise of the international 
treaty-making power2 but certainly, it is a matter that has been developed and is 
increasingly being developed by international law instruments.3  
                                               
1 In this contribution, the term ‗crossborder cooperation‘ will be used as an overarching concept referring 
to any concerted action conducted mainly by subnational authorities (and occasionally by national states 
with other subnational units) belonging to different countries, aimed at establishing or fostering their 
cooperation. The preference for the mentioned terms relies on the wishing to avoid the terminology in 
use in specific institutions, namely the CoE and the EU. According to the Council of Europe legal 
instruments, ‗transfrontier cooperation‘ refers to cooperation between neighbouring territories. The 
signing and entry into force of Protocol No. 2 of the Madrid Outline Convention introduced the notion of 
‗interterritorial‘ cooperation, referring to cooperation among territorial authorities not sharing a common 
border. In the EU INTERREG framework, transborder and interterritorial types of cooperation were 
labelled respectively cross-border and interregional cooperation. A third concept was also developed 
within the EU: the ‗transnational cooperation‘, referring to cooperation among national, regional and 
local units of at least two Member States. Starting with the 2007-2013 EU structural funds programming 
period, the three previous strands of INTERREG were renamed ―territorial cooperation‖. 
Thus, CBC, as it is used in this contribution, is comparable to the ―territorial cooperation‖ notion, as it is 
currently applied in the EU framework. However, the EU territorial cooperation concept, by avoiding any 
reference to the extra-territorial effect (as all the previous terms did, by means of prefixes such as trans-, 
inter-, cross-), seems to convey the idea that cooperation between subnational units pertaining to different 
EU Member States is almost an internal form of cooperation within the EU territory. Because of that, it 
seems a notion deeply-rooted in the EU conceptual framework. Cross-border cooperation seems more 
neutral and it maintains the idea of a cooperation having an extra-territorial character.  
In the literature, the cross-border cooperation notion has been used to define ―a more or less 
institutionalised collaboration between contiguous subnational authorities across national borders‖ (see 
Markus Perkmann, ‗Cross-Border Regions in Europe – Significance and Drivers of Regional Cross-
border Co-operation‘, in (2003) European Urban and Regional studies, 10(2), 153-171, 156). According to 
the further criteria mentioned by the Author, in order to better define the use of the concept, CBC 
involves public actors and it lacks any international character due to the fact the players are not legal 
subjects for the international law. This notion is different to CBC as it is used in the present contribution, 
since it refers to contiguous subnational cooperation and it suggests that CBC always implies a certain 
territorial institutionalisation, which, according to us, is only a potential development of CBC. 
2 There is a general consensus that CBC has not any international law dimension. This opinion is 
generally based on the premise that CBC is conducted by territorial players which are not legal subjects 
according to the international law, although this finding might be questioned in the light of the 
provisions, set in the EGTC Regulation and Protocol No. 3, foreseeing the participation of the national 
states in the EGTC and ECG. 
According to some international scholars, the fact the players of CBC are not legal subjects according to 
the international legal order is not a decisive argument, though it can be an indicator of the non 
international nature of the cross-border agreements along with the material content and the will of the 
parties concerned. See L. Mura, Gli accordi delle regioni con soggetti esteri e il diritto internazionale, 
(Giappichelli, Torino, 2007). In fact, it is argued that according to international law the state is to be 
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Nor is CBC a purely domestic legal issue. As a matter of fact, whereas in the past the 
legal capacity for the subnational units to perform CBC or to set a CBC body was dealt 
with by the national state, by means of domestic provisions or international agreements 
the state decided to agree upon, today the increasing regulatory role of the EU in the 
CBC field with the adoption of Regulation 1082/20064 – which sets common provisions 
concerning the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) – seems to 
undermine this finding. The EGTC Regulation has allowed subnational units to 
conclude a cross-border convention with homologous foreign counterparts for a CBC 
body establishment, no matter if such a possibility was previously granted according to 
the relevant domestic legal order. This is the case of Italy, where, until the EGTC 
Regulation adoption, the subnational units were not allowed to set a CBC body.5 
 
Thus, the paper argues that the key factor for explaining the legal nature of the CBC 
―European law‖ is exactly the interaction amongst supranational and national legal 
orders, a feature that makes it particularly difficult to settle disputes when they arise 
before the judiciary. 6 
 
To this extent, it may be noted that although the CoE and the EU legal instruments 
concerning CBC are deeply different in their nature and function (with the CoE aimed 
                                                                                                                                            
considered as an overall subject which can be represented internationally by any internal organ. This 
principle is today enshrined in art. 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Vienna 
Convention itself has introduced a derogation to the principle. According to art. 46 (which at present can 
not be considered as a codification of a general customary international rule) a state may not invoke a 
violation of its internal law as a ground of illegitimacy of the Treaty ―unless the violation was manifest 
and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance‖. It should be also mentioned that in 
the light of art. 7 of the Vienna Convention – a provision which enumerates the conditions or the 
situations according to which a person is considered as representing the state for the purpose of adopting 
the text of a treaty – there seems to be a strong presumption against the fact a subnational units, when it 
concludes a CBC agreement, could be considered as representing the state for the purposing of adopting 
an international treaty. The situation would be different and it should be assessed case by case when the 
CBC players enjoy the treaty making power according to their domestic constitutional provisions. See 
Luigi Condorelli, Francesco Salerno, ‗Le relazioni transfrontaliere tra comunità locali in Europa nel 
diritto internazionale ed europeo‘, (1986) 36(2) Rivista Trimestrale Diritto Pubblico, 381-423. 
3 See P.M. Dupuy, ―La coopération régionale transfrontalière et le droit international‖, in (1977) Annuaire 
Française de droit international, 1977, 854 : « loin d‘apparaître un obstacle, [le droit international public] 
serait alors au service de la coopération régionale transfrontalière ». 
4 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 1082/2006 of 5 July 2006 on a European Grouping 
of Territorial Cooperation [2006], OJ, L 210/19. 
5 It must be noted, however, that, as we will point out later in the text, the national state still retain wide 
discretion in denying the setting of an EGTC. Nonetheless, this is not unrestrained since the state has to 
give a statement of its reason for the denial which can be judicially reviewed.  
6 For an interesting example, see decision 258 of 22 July 2004 of the Italian constitutional court, where 
the constitutional judges rejected the thesis of the central government according to which the national 
law enforcing the Madrid convention on CBC – a statute requiring the subnational units to obtain the 
agreement with the government before concluding a CBC agreement – was applicable to a CBC 
convention concluded within the framework of an INTERREG program. According to the court, the 
above mentioned CBC convention has to be considered as EU law. Moreover, the court considered the 
creation of a CBC body legitimate, if occurred within the INTERREG program context. The reasoning 
followed by the court seems to suggest that CBC occurring and regulated according to EU law is 
inherently different from other forms of CBC, as those regulated by the EOC or bilateral international 
agreements, and because of that requires a more lenient scrutiny by the national authorities. 
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to provide a minimal common regulation, according to international law standards, and 
the EU aimed to provide substantial legal harmonisation of EU Member States 
legislations),7 they share nonetheless the common goal of harmonising European 
national legislation and they highlight common legal developments.8  
 
The idea we will develop in the first part of the paper is that this common supranational 
trend is based on the favouring of CBC institutionalisation. CBC is no longer conceived 
in terms of focus-tailored transfrontier action but rather in terms of transfrontier policy. 
Within this context, CBC bodies are increasingly considered as policy coordination 
tools where large and influential subnational territorial players take part.  
 
At the same time, however, it would be a mistake to overestimate the harmonising role 
played by the above-mentioned supranational forces. In fact, in both the EU and CoE 
legal instruments the references to the domestic legal orders are still important and 
meaningful. Despite the ―common core‖ provisions on the setting of a CBC body, both 
the EGTC Regulation and the Protocol No. 3 of the European Outline Convention on 
Transfrontier Cooperation concerning Euroregional Co-operation Groupings remit to 
the domestic law where the CBC body has its headquarters as a subsidiary source to be 
applied in the case substantial rules are lacking.9  
 
This is not the only case. Probably, the most important example of the still decisive role 
played by the national state as a regulator of the CBC is the fact that both the EGTC 
Regulation and the Protocol no. 3 grant national states wide power in deciding on the 
setting of a CBC body by referring to concepts such as national public interest or public 
policy. 10 
 
The enforcement of these notions mostly relies on political evaluations that are likely to 
be influenced by the approach the relevant state has progressively showed towards 
CBC. Because of that, in the second part the paper will draw attention to the different 
existing national attitudes in order to see how they can influence the acceptability, both 
at a formal and informal level, of the common regulatory solutions put forward by the 
international and the European legal orders.  
                                               
7 For an useful comparison of the CoE and EU interventions in the field, see Alice Engl, ‗Future 
Perspectives on Territorial Cooperation in Europe: The EC Regulation on a European Grouping of 
Territorial Cooperation and the Planned Council of Europe Third Protocol to the Madrid Outline 
Convention concerning Euroregional Co-operation Groupings‘, (2007) 3 European Diversity and Autonomy 
Papers-EDAP, at <www.eurac.edu/edap>. 
8 On this issue, see the contributions edited by Henry Labayle (ed.), Vers un droit commun de la coopération 
transfrontalière? (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2006). 
9 See art. 2.1.c) of the Regulation 1082/2006; art. 2.2 e 2.3. Protocol No. 3 to the European Outline 
Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning 
Euroregional Cooperation Groupings, signed in Utrecht on 16 November 2009. Text available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/206.htm>. 
10 See art. 4.3 of the Regulation 1082/2006; art. 4.5 Protocol No. 3 to the Madrid Outline Convention. It 
should be noted that these concepts, though remitting to the national legal orders and practices for their 
enforcement, for the very fact of being inserted respectively in an European Union and Coe legal 
document also become international and EU notions. Needless to say, in relation to the EU, that as a 
consequence it would be possible to refer the Court of justice for indirectly reviewing the domestic 
enforcement of the above-mentioned concepts when they should contradict the effet utile of the EGTC 
Regulation. 
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To this extent, the research assumes that CBC may take on different forms or be 
differently regulated according to some variables, such as the degree of regionalisation 
of the national legal order, the usual pattern of relations between the national state and 
the subnational territorial level, the relevant national constitutional case law, the 
existence of national minorities across the borders.  
 
The paper is divided in two parts. The first will deal with the international and 
European harmonising trends we may currently find in Europe. The second will focus 
on exploring the above-mentioned factors influencing the national policies concerning 
CBC. Finally, some considerations will be made concerning the implications derived by 
this interplay between harmonising trends and national regulations. To that extent 
some references will be made with regard to the domestic enforcement process of the 
EGTC Regulation. 
 
2. The Harmonizing Trends: Council of Europe and EU Involvement 
in CBC 
 
The original idea of CBC, as it has been set out by the European Outline Convention on 
Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities and Authorities (EOC), 
provided that it was mainly directed at solving local tailored problems between 
homologous territorial units. The current trend emerging both at the CoE and at the 
EU levels is towards a more dynamic form of CBC.  
 
The dynamic nature of the CBC has to be put into relation with the fact that CBC is not 
just a matter of dealing with the problems of proximity between communities and 
territories lying on either side of borders but of putting together genuine projects for 
CBC areas and implementing real CBC policy. 11 
 
In this part of the paper we will single out this emerging new conception of CBC by 
referring to the supranational instruments currently influencing the European legal 
landscape, namely the CoE acquis, the bi- or plurilateral international agreements 
adopted to enforce the EOC, the EU legal framework. 
 
The first element suggesting such an evolution is the trend favoring public nature CBC 
institutionalization by means of supranational document setting ―hard core‖ rules. 
 
The second element is the involvement of territorial players with the greatest ―political 
capacity‖, that is, with the ability to intervene in public matters and use their political 
                                               
11 See Henry Comte, ‗Les acteurs et la légitimité des projets stratégiques transfrontaliers‘, in Henry 
Comte, Nicolas Levrat (ed.s), Aux coutures de l’Europe – Défis et enjeux juridiques de la coopération 
transfrontalière, (L‘Harmattan, Paris, 2006), 185-208 ; at 185-186: ―Il ne s‘agit plus seulement de traiter des 
problèmes de proximités entre des communautés et des territoire séparés par une frontière mais bel et 
bien de fonder de véritables projets de territoires transfrontaliers.‖ 
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standing to change the results.12 This means that CBC conceived as a policy demands 
the involvement both of sufficiently large territorial units and at the same time of the 
state, which is called to perform a more proactive role in CBC, not merely a regulatory 
one.13 
2.1 The Council of Europe Acquis on CBC 
 
Certainly, the first contribution to the so-called European law of CBC was given by the 
entry into force on 22 December 1981 of the European Outline Convention on 
Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities and Authorities (EOC), 
signed under the Umbrella of the Council of Europe. 
 
It took quite a long time before the text of the EOC was agreed upon. This clearly 
reflects the still persisting suspicions of the Contracting Parties towards CBC, 
considered as an instrument potentially affecting state sovereignty. As a consequence, 
the EOC is deprived of any direct legal effect,14 and it does not confer to subnational 
units any power to conclude cross-border legal agreements. Such a power can be 
conferred provided that the Contacting Parties decide to do so, having regard for their 
different constitutional provisions. In any case, the states maintain a supervision power 
in order to ensure that the general policy or the international relations of the state as a 
whole might not be affected.15 Moreover, the EOC explicitly permits the Contracting 
Parties to subject CBC to the previous conclusion of international bilateral agreements 
between the Contracting Parties themselves, with the aim to set the context, forms and 
limits within which territorial communities and authorities may cooperate.16 
 
Thus, it is difficult to say that the aim of the EOC was that of providing even a low 
degree of standardization concerning the regulation of CBC. In fact, the EOC merely 
places upon the Contracting Parties a duty ―to facilitate and foster transfrontier 
cooperation between territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of 
two or more Contracting Parties‖ (Art. 1), and it leaves the Contracting Parties the task 
of regulating CBC by means either of national legislation or international bilateral 
agreements.  
                                               
12 The concept of ―political capacity‖ has been developed by Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in 
Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change, (Cheltenham, Northampton Mass. Elgar, 
1998) at 135. 
13 On the role of the state in dealing with CBC, see the contributions edited by Carlos Fernandez de 
Casadevante Romani (ed.), L’Etat et la coopération transfrontalière, (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007). 
14 See Emmanuel Decaux, ‗La convention-cadre sur la coopération transfrontalière des collectivités ou des 
autorités locales‘, (1984) 88(3) RGDIP, 557-620, at 557; Manlio Frigo, ‗La cooperazione regionale nella 
convenzione del Consiglio d‘Europa del 1980 e i limiti della sua attuazione in Italia‘, in Angelo Mattioni, 
Giorgio Sacerdoti (eds.), Regioni, costituzione e rapporti internazionali. Relazioni con la Comunità europea e 
cooperazione transfrontaliera (Franco Angeli, Milano, 1995), 71-96; Nicolas Levrat, ―L‘émergence des 
instruments juridiques de la coopération transfrontalière au sein du Conseil de l‘Europe‖, in Yves Lejeune 
(ed.), Le droit des relations transfrontalières entre autorités régionales ou locales relevant d’Etats distincts 
(Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005), 17-35.  
15 See Articles 2 and 3.4 of the EOC. The EOC text is available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/html/106.htm>. 
16 See Article 3.2 of the EOC. For a closer examination of the main interstate agreements concluded with 
the aim of enforcing the EOC, see the further paragraph in the text. 
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The strategic importance of the EOC does not rely on the practical and effective 
solutions it puts forward for enacting CBC. Rather, its relevance is due to the fact of 
transforming CBC ―from an activity at best tolerated into an explicitly mentioned ‗legal‘ 
activity, which the Contracting states have agreed to promote‖.17 The EOC set out the 
idea that the cooperation between subnational units belonging to two different national 
jurisdictions does not involve any use of international law,18 but rather it is a way of 
exercising, according to an ―external dimension‖, the powers that a national legal order 
grants to the subnational units. 
 
It is, nonetheless, particularly interesting to investigate the idea of CBC, which emerges 
in the EOC and to see how it has changed. With regard to this, some issues must be 
highlighted. 
 
First, if we take into account Article 2 of the EOC,19 we note that the Contracting 
Parties adopted a narrow idea of transfrontier cooperation, essentially limited to 
―neighbourly relations‖.20 
 
Moreover, it has been noted that the neighbourly agreements of subnational units 
usually present a common material object. They do not have great political importance, 
and they consist of the management of local public services on a transborder area, such 
as waste collecting, water canalization, firefighters, etc.21  
 
Finally, it is worth considering that the EOC specifies that for its purposes the terms 
‗territorial communities‘ or ‗authorities‘ ―shall mean communities, authorities or bodies 
exercising local and regional functions‖.22 According to the explanatory report, this 
wording was used as a general category, which could cover any form of existing 
subnational unit.23 However, it could also suggests the idea that CBC and its legal 
regulation may vary depending on the scale—regional rather than local—of the 
                                               
17 Francesco Palermo, Jens Woelk, ‗Cross-Border Cooperation as an Indicator for Institutional Evolution 
of Autonomy: The Case of Trentino-South Tyrol‘, in Zelim A. Skurbaty, Beyond a One-Dimensional State: 
an Emerging Right to Autonomy (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden-Boston, 2005), 277-304, at 283. 
18 Explanatory report on the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier cooperation, available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/html/106.htm>, point 35: ―In no event are the central 
government‘s powers in general policy-making or the conduct of international relations affected by the 
Convention. The Convention does not have the effect of conferring an ‗international‘ character on 
transfrontier relations‖.  
19 Article 2 of the EOC: ―For the purpose of the Convention, transfrontier cooperation shall mean any 
concerted action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relation between territorial communities or 
authorities within the jurisdiction of other contracting parties‖. 
20 See the explanatory report on the EOC, at 18, according to which ‗neighbourhood‘ implies a certain 
proximity that should make possible, even in cases in which no territorial strip has been designated by the 
relevant State, the ruling out of unjustified requests. 
21 See Nicolas Levrat, Le droit applicable aux accords de coopération transfrontière entre collectivités publiques 
infra-étatique (PUF, Paris, 1994)  at 54-55. 
22 See Article 2.2 of the EOC. 
23 See the EOC explanatory report at point 24. 
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subnational units involved. The EOC, though, did not provide such a distinction, 
implicitly suggesting they are the same phenomenon.24  
 
Thus, in the light of these remarks, we may observe that the EOC text conceives CBC 
in a very limited way.  
 
It is mainly seen as an instrument to solve technical or administrative problems of 
neighbouring local subnational units.25 The EOC failure to empower the subnational 
units with the setting of a CBC body reveals that the transborder relations are 
considered inherently episodic and sectorial. Probably at that time, the CBC 
institutionalization was considered premature and potentially too dangerous in respect 
of the national general interest and of the national foreign policy. As a matter of fact, for 
a state, it is easier to scrutinize a single CBC agreement than the institutional activity of 
a CBC body, which is very often vaguely defined in the institutive documents. 
 
The EOC was much criticized. At least three general problems have been identified with 
it: the lack of any real recognition of the right of territorial communities or authorities 
to conclude transfrontier cooperation agreements; the legal force of the acts taken in the 
context of transfrontier cooperation; and the setting of a transfrontier body.26 
 
It is in this scenario that an Additional Protocol to the EOC was elaborated. Signed in 
1995 and entered into force in 1998, the Additional Protocol marks a meaningful step 
towards the strengthening of the CBC, by addressing the main shortcomings identified 
with the EOC.27  
 
First, it explicitly grants to territorial communities or authorities the right to conclude 
transfrontier-cooperation agreements.28 
Second, it also clarifies the problem concerning the legal nature of these agreements and 
their legal effect.29  
                                               
24 As I will point out later in the text, I am persuaded that CBC must be distinguished by whether it is 
conducted by local subnational units or by regional units enjoying meaningful powers, such as the 
legislative ones. In his book, Nicolas Levrat (Le droit applicable … op. cit., note 21)  notes that a 
differentiation between local and regional transfrontier cooperation was used in some CoE documents and 
by some legal scholarship (140) but he does not draw from this any consequences.. He argues that there 
does not exist a common notion of ‗region‘ and that the CBC legal instruments are the same, independent 
by the territorial scale of the subnational units involved (144). Though many of these findings are true, I 
still believe important to take into account that the national regulatory framework of CBC is substantially 
influenced by the ‗political‘ weight the subnational units enjoy according to their domestic legal systems. 
The more influential they are, the more the general interests, included those of foreign policy, of the 
states could be undermined.  
25 See Roberto Toniatti, ‗La bozza di statuto della regione europea‘, in Peter Pernthaler and Sergio Ortino 
(eds.), Europaregion Tirol, Euregio Tirolo. Rechtliche Voraussetzungen und Scharken der Institutionalisierung/ 
Le basi giuridiche ed i limiti della sua istituzionalizzazione (Autonome Region Trentino-Südtirol/Regione 
Autonoma Trentino-Alto Adige, Trento, 1997), 17-38, at 27. 
26 See the explanatory report on the Additional Protocol to the European Outline Convention on 
Transfrontiers Co-operation between Territorial communities or Authorities, point 5, at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/reports/html/159.htm>. 
27 See Bernard Dolez, ‗Le Protocole Additionnel à la Convention Cadre Européenne sur la coopération 
transfrontalière des collectivités ou autorités territoriales‘, (1996) 100(4) RGDIP, 1005-1022. 
28 See Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the EOC. 
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A third issue addressed by the Protocol is the legal possibility of setting up a CBC body 
with legal capacity.30 
 
The Additional Protocol introduced many improvements in order to effectively develop 
CBC. However, it did not repeal an important restriction to CBC contained in the EOC, 
namely the limitation of it to neighbourly relations and the consequent idea of a CBC 
essentially limited to solve problems of bordering territories.  
 
It was only with the signature and the entry into force of the Protocol No. 2 on inter-
territorial cooperation that the legal instruments and the regulatory framework of the 
EOC and of the Additional Protocol have been extended to external cooperation not 
involving any neighbourly relations.31  
 
Another problem with the Additional Protocol is that the provisions enabling the 
subnational units to set a cross-border body do not provide a common legal framework, 
rather they refer to the national domestic legal system. This has caused many problems 
in the effective implementation of CBC. In some cases, the conclusion of interstate 
agreements, providing a common regulatory framework for such a body, has proven to 
be a solution. Despite the need for a text establishing a clear and effective legal 
framework for institutionalised cooperation between territorial communities or 
authorities, it was only in 2009 that the CoE adopts Protocol No. 3 to the EOC 
concerning Euroregional Co-operation Groupings32, a text offering basic uniform rules 
for the setting of a cross-border body. 
 
Thus, the CoE acquis on transfrontier cooperation seems at first a story of legal breaches 
and turning points, with the three Protocols progressively expanding CBC.  
 
It should be noted, however, that it was the EOC itself that made CBC legal regulation 
an evolving issue. Article 8.2 of the EOC explicitly mentions the procedure the 
Contracting Parties should follow in order to add or extend the convention itself. This 
reflects the idea of the ‗evolutive nature‘ of the EOC, in which it may be perfected and 
expanded in light of experience acquired when implementing the provisions of the 
convention.33  
 
                                                                                                                                            
29 See Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the EOC and the explanatory report on the Additional 
Protocol to the EOC, at points 16-18. 
30 Articles 3 to 5 of the Additional Protocol to the EOC. Further details are provided in footnote 53. 
31 See Protocol No. 2 to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between 
Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning interterritorial cooperation, Strasbourg, 5 May 1998. 
Text available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Html/169.htm>. Interterritorial cooperation 
is defined in Article 1 of Protocol No. 2 as ―any concerted action designed to establish relations between 
territorial communities or authorities [...] other than relations on trans-frontier cooperation of 
neighbouring authorities‖. 
32 See Protocol No. 3 to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between 
Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning Euroregional Cooperation Groupings, signed in 
Utrecht on 16 November 2009. Text available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/206.htm>.  
33 See the explanatory report on the EOC text, at point 14. 
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Moreover, it should be noted that the EOC‘s drafters put the regulatory framework of 
the CBC in appended models and outline agreements, deprived of legal force, rather 
than in the text itself of the convention. According to the explanatory report this was 
due to a need for flexibility. The Contracting Parties and the territorial communities 
were therefore provided with a wide range of possible solutions to meet the various 
cooperation needs.34  
 
However, a different explanation may be suggested. Because, among the Contracting 
Parties there were different policies towards CBC, the EOC was meant to provide a 
minimal common legal framework. The diplomatic compromise reached or needed to 
agree with the EOC on did not allow the possible legal developments of CBC – already 
put in place in some Member States - to be included in the EOC text at the time of its 
signature. 
 
According to this view, the attached models can be read as a possible prelude of the 
legal developments of CBC at the CoE level, once the Contracting Parties would have 
agreed to consider them as common legal solutions. Their analysis is important, then, to 
the extent it reveals an idea of CBC much more complex than that effectively delineated 
in the EOC text. 
 
Among the interstate model agreements attached at the moment of the EOC signature, 
we want to focus on those listed as n 1.2 and 1.5, dealing with, respectively, a model of 
interstate agreement on regional transfrontier cooperation and a model of interstate 
agreement dealing with the setting of a transfrontier body. 
 
Focusing on the first of them, it is interesting to note that although the EOC text treats 
regional and local CBC as the same phenomenon, the above-mentioned model of 
interstate agreement on regional transfrontier cooperation suggests a different 
conclusion. In fact, this model agreement recommends the establishment of both an 
intergovernmental commission—comprising national and regional delegates of both 
national contracting parties—and of regional committees—made up of representatives 
of regional and local authorities. The main task of the regional committee is to 
investigate, in different areas, with the aim to make proposals and recommendation to 
the intergovernmental commission. Thus, the role of the regions here is not operative. 
The regions, rather, are called upon to perform a coordinating role, bringing together 
the relevant territorial players, included the state itself and the local authorities.  
 
As far as the second model, appended to the EOC, it deals with the possibility for State 
to regulate by international agreement the establishment of a CBC body. Thus, this 
reveals that the EOC drafters were aware of the need to provide a regulatory framework 
for CBC body, an issue formally addressed only at a later stage, with the Additional 
Protocol signature.  
                                               
34 See the explanatory report on the EOC text, at point 30. 
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2.2 Interstate international agreements on CBC in Europe 
 
Several interstate agreements concerning CBC among subnational units have been 
signed in Europe, mainly for developing and regulating the principles contained in the 
EOC. The purpose of this section is to analyze them according to some common key 
points.35 
2.2.1 Why Concluding bi- or multilateral treaties on CBC? 
 
A good starting point to deal with our issue is to wonder whether there is a need to sign 
interstates agreements regulating CBC among subnational units. To this extent, it is 
important to refer to Article 3.2 of the EOC. This provision gives the national 
Contracting Parties the option to subject the EOC application to the previous 
conclusion of an interstate agreement with the other Party concerned. 
 
Article 3.2 can be considered a sign of the Contracting Parties‘ mistrust of CBC. The 
idea that every external relation should pertain to the central level was still dominant in 
the 1980s. Therefore, the previous conclusion of an international agreement, as a 
precondition to permit CBC to develop, meant that the power of subnational units to 
perform external actions could be neither implicitly derived from their internal 
competences nor from the EOC itself. The foreign-relations power was considered as a 
matter reserved for the national level. As such, the power of the subnational units to 
conduct foreign contacts or relations had to be explicitly recognized and it was in any 
case considered as a derogation to the general rule that foreign relations pertain in 
principle to the national state. 
 
Moreover, the previous conclusion of an international agreement gave the national 
government a powerful instrument to control and limit the scope of transfrontier 
cooperation. 
 
However, it should be noted that only a few Contracting Parties made use of the 
possibility created by Article 3.2. This is the case of Italy and Spain, whereas France, 
which originally made use of this declaration, withdrew it at a later stage.  
 
This finding reveals that the interstate agreements in the field of subnational CBC are 
to be conceived only to a very limited extent as a means to legitimize and to put under 
strict control a practice very often developed beyond the law. Rather, they are very 
often instruments necessary to provide a clearer legal framework, permitting cross-
                                               
35 For a general overview of the issue, see Carlos Férnandez de Casadevante Romani, ‗Les traites 
internationaux, outils indispensables de la coopération transfrontalière entre collectivités ou autorités 
territoriales‘, in Henry Labayle (ed.), Vers un droit commun de la coopération transfrontalière?, op. cit. note 8, 
89-118. See also Carlos Férnandez de Casadevante Romani, ‗Le Traité de Bayonne et l‘Accord de 
Bruxelles sur la coopération transfrontalière entre collectivités territoriales‘, in Yves Lejeune (ed.), Les 
droits des relations transfrontalières entre autorités régionales ou locales relevant d’états distincts, op. cit. note 14, 
37-50. 
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border actors to solve the practical problems they encounter in cooperation among 
them. This is so especially considering that the EOC and its subsequent Additional 
Protocol failed to provide a common legal framework. 
 
To this regard, the case of France is particularly interesting.36 At the time of the 
signature of the EOC, France, as noted above, issued a declaration in pursuance of 
Article 3.2 of the EOC, thus limiting CBC subnational units to the previous conclusion 
of an international agreement. Later, the French government changed its policy 
towards CBC. In 1992, the French subnational units were granted general power to 
conclude administrative agreements with their foreign counterparts and to set public 
bodies for transborder cooperation.37 In 1995 they were allowed to take part in CBC 
public bodies ruled by a foreign law.38 As a consequence of this legislative and political 
evolution, the declaration to the EOC was withdrawn. However, even the most 
permissive national regulation towards transborder cooperation is useless if the other 
national counterparts do not provide a similar pattern. That may explain why France 
concluded international agreements with almost all of its neighbouring states. In some 
cases, such as the Bayonne39 and the Rome40 treaties, respectively, with Spain and Italy, 
the international agreements did not add anything to the legal possibilities already 
offered by the domestic legislation. However, these international agreements were 
nonetheless necessary for permitting transborder cooperation to develop along these 
borders. CBC is a mutual relation: lacking an EU harmonizing legislative intervention, 
an international agreement with the bordering national counterpart was the only way to 
provide the common legal framework necessary to deal with relations having a 
transnational character.  
 
An international agreement on CBC may also have the goal of strengthening CBC, 
offering more instruments for its development. This is the case with various 
international treaties concluded with the aim of providing a legal regulation for public 
law–based CBC, in areas in which CBC practices, grounded in private law, were already 
well developed.41 
                                               
36 For a general overview of the French legal framework concerning CBC, see Christian Autexier, ‗De la 
coopération décentralisée (commentaire du titre IV de la loi d‘orientation du 6 février 1992, relative à 
l‘administration de la République)‘, in (1993) 9 (3) Revue Française de Droit Administratif, 411-423; Conseil 
d‘Etat (ed.), Le Cadre juridique de l’action extérieure des collectivités locales (La documentation française-
Collection les études du Conseil d‘Etat, Paris, 2006); Daniel Dürr, ―La création des organismes de 
coopération transfrontalière‖, 235-249, and Patrick Janin, ―Le statut et le régime juridique des organismes 
de coopération transfrontalière en droit français‖, 251-261, both in Comte and Levrat, Aux coutures de 
l’Europe, op. cit. note 11. 
37 See Loi d’orientation relative à l’adminitsration territoriale de la Répubblique, No.92-125, 6 February 1992, 
in Journal Officiel République Française (JORF), 8 February 1992, 2064-2083. 
38 See Loi d’orientation pour l’aménagement et le développement, No.95-115, 4 February 1995 in JORF 5 
February 1995. 
39 The Bayonne Treaty was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1997. The French text is available in 
JORF No. 59, 10 March 1995. 
40 The Rome Treaty was signed between France and Italy on 26 November 1993. The French text is 
published in JORF No. 5 of 6 January 1996. 
41 See, for example, the preamble of the Benelux Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between 
Territorial Communities or Authorities signed 1986 by Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in 
1986. French version: ―Constatant avec satisfaction que les collectivités ou autorités territoriales 
collaborent déjà souvent entre elles de part et d‘autre des frontières intra-Benelux sur base du droit privé, 
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Thus, international agreements regulating CBC among local bodies can serve different 
goals: they may be a legitimizing source of a practice otherwise deemed illegitimate; 
they may be a necessary way to solve practical problems raised as a consequence of the 
transnational nature of the cross-border relations; and they may provide instruments to 
deepen transborder cooperation. 
2.2.2 The Setting Up of a CBC Body: from Episodic to Systemic CBC 
 
Many issues can be considered when assessing the goals pursued by a state in 
concluding an interstate international agreement on CBC among subnational units. 
However, one of the most important is certainly whether the treaty regulates or not, 
and to what extent and powers, a public body for CBC. In fact, a cross-border body 
permits the subnational units to develop with their homologous foreign counterparts 
more-systematic cooperation and to establish a permanent arena for discussion and 
policy-making coordination42. It is clear that a national legal order that grants such a 
legal possibility to its subnational units implicitly considers CBC an instrument of 
development, rather than as a threat to its general and foreign policy. 
 
Keeping in mind these remarks, we can now class the relevant international agreements 
as follows: 
 
A first group includes the international agreements signed by Italy with France, Austria 
and Switzerland. The agreements all reveal a suspicious attitude towards CBC. In fact, 
they permit the subnational units to conclude agreements with their foreign 
counterparts, but they do not allow the establishment of cross-border bodies. Moreover, 
the material scope of the cooperation agreements is limited to those matters specifically 
listed in each treaty. The reason for that is clear: by allowing territorial communities to 
conclude only specific agreements on previously established matters, the supervision 
power of the national state is more effective and the risk for the coherence of the 
national foreign policy is reduced. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Souhaitant créer pour celle-ci la possibilité de coopérer également sur la base de droit public.‖ The French 
text of the treaty is available in (247) Moniteur Belge (1991). See also the Isselburg-Anholt Agreement on 
transfrontier cooperation among territorial units, signed in 1991 between Germany, Rhine-Westphalia, 
Lower Saxony, and the Netherlands, published in BGBI, 1993, Teil II, 842. (French translation): 
―Souhaitant donner à ces collectivités ou autorités et à d'autre organismes publics la possibilités de 
coopérer sur la base du droit public.‖ 
42 In general terms on the institutionalization of the CBC, see Noralv Veggeland, ‗Regional Governance, 
Euroregions, Flexibility, Power and Rights‘, 46-52, Joseph Marko, ‗Beyond the Nation State: Problems of 
Regionalisation in Western and East Central Europe‘, 65-77, and Thomas Christiansen, ‗Borders and 
territorial Governance in New Europe‘, 78-106, all contributions in Renate Kicker, Joseph Marko, 
Michael Steiner (ed.s), Changing Borders: Legal and Economic Aspects of European Enlargement (Peter Lang, 
Frankfurter am Mein, 1998); Markus Perkmann, Ngai-Ling Sum (eds.), Globalization, Regionalization and 
Cross-Border Regions (Macmillan, Palgrave, 2002); Markus Perkman, ‗Construction of New Territorial 
Scales: A Framework and Case Study of the EUREGIO Cross-border Region‘, (2007) 41(2) Regional 
Studies, 253-266. 
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A second group regards those international treaties that empower subnational units to 
set up public cross-border bodies. However, the treaty itself does not provide a common 
legal regulation for it. Rather, it refers to already existing administrative institutions 
regulated by the relevant national legislations, usually for inter-municipal cooperation. 
Moreover, the task of the cross-border body is mainly that of providing transborder 
public services, rather than being a organisation for policy coordination. We may 
include in this second group the Bayonne Treaty, signed between France and Spain,43 
and the recent treaty signed between Spain and Portugal in Valencia.44  
 
A third group to be considered is represented by the Karlsruhe Accord.45 Unlike the 
other above-mentioned international treaties, the Karlsruhe Accord provides substantial 
common rules for the setting up and functioning of a cross-border body, not merely a 
reference to the national inter-municipal legislations. The model is represented by the 
so-called groupement local de cooperation transfrontaliére (GLCT). This is a body whose 
legal regulation is to be found partly in the Karlsruhe Accord and partly in the 
constituting documents of the body itself that the parties have to adopt. For what is not 
explicitly regulated by the above-mentioned sources, the national law regulating inter-
municipal associations of the state in which the organ has its headquarters applies. 
 
The GLCT has been a legal model for following international treaties concerning 
CBC,46 for national law dealing with transborder organs (the French district européen) 
and even for EGTC Regulation. The success the GLCT model has encountered may be 
explained when considering that the subnational units pertaining to different domestic 
legal orders prefer to adopt an instrument whose regulation is common to the parties, 
rather than being subject to the national law of one of them. 
 
The fourth model of public cross-border bodies that we should consider is represented 
by the Benelux Convention, which is certainly the most sophisticated, although not 
necessarily the most effective one. 
                                               
43 See Article 5 of the Bayonne Treaty: ―Les collectivités territoriales espagnoles et françaises peuvent 
créer conjointement, en France, des groupements d‘intérêt public de coopération transfrontalière ou des 
sociétés mixte locale dont l‘objet est d‘exploiter les services publics d‘intérêt commun et, en Espagne, des 
groupement ‗consorcios‘.‖ On the Bayonne Treaty see, Carlos Fernandez de Casadevante Romani, ‗Le 
traité de Bayonne du 10 mars 1995 relatif à la coopération transfrontalière entre collectivités territoriales: 
un cadre juridique complet‘, (1998) 102(2) Revue générale de droit international public, 306-325. 
44 The Valencia Treaty was signed between Portugal and Spain 3 October 2002, and it entered into force 
in 2004. See the Spanish text in Boletin Oficial del Estado (BOE) n. 219, 12 September 2003 The treaty 
enables the Portuguese and the Spanish subnational units to set a public crossborder body with a legal 
entity. This may take the form of associações de direito publico or empresas municipais if the Portuguese law 
applies or consorcios if Spanish law applies. However, some organizing rules are set in the treaty itself. 
45 On the Karlsruhe Agreement see Bernard Perrin, ‗Coopération transfrontalière des collectivités locales 
contenu et limites de l‘Accord quadrilatéral de Karlsruhe‘, (1996) 289 Revue Administrative, 81-89. This 
agreement, concluded among Luxembourg, Germany, France and Switzerland (the last acting on behalf 
of the Soleure, Bâle-Ville, Bâle-Campagne, Argovie and Jura cantons), was signed in 1996 and entered 
into force 1 September 1997. The French text is published in JORF of 29 August 1997. The Karlsruhe 
Agreement reproduces many aspect set in the German-Dutch agreement signed at Isselburg-Anholt, 
which also allows the subnational units to establish an öffentlich-rechtlichen Zweckverband, a public law 
association with legal personality which is entitled to act on behalf of its members.  
46 See especially the Bruxelles Agreement signed in 2002 and entered into force in 2004. It was concluded 
by France, Belgium, the Flemish Region, the Wallonia Region and the French-speaking community. 
French text available at the Moniteur Belge, 16 January 2004. 
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This public transfrontier institution may enact regulatory acts which are directly 
binding to member parties and third parties.47 The acts passed by the body produce 
legal effects with no need for domestic implementation in all the territories pertaining 
to the constituent parties. This makes the organ a real cross-border territorial 
authority.  
 
Because of the meaningful powers that the body may exert, the Benelux Convention 
provides that the institutive documents of the cross-border public body must not be in 
conflict with the national laws of each country involved.48 Moreover, the decisions made 
must respect the national laws of the parties concerned, with it being otherwise possible 
for the national authority to suspend the act itself. A special commissioner position has 
been created whose task it is to solve the legal problems that may arise during the 
cooperation.49 In case of the intervention‘s failure, the commissioner refers the case to a 
special intergovernmental commission. 
 
The strong model of cross-border public bodies delineated by the Benelux Convention 
has not been followed by other national legal orders, even if territorially contiguous. 
This is especially the case of the German–Dutch agreement of May 1991 signed in 
Isselburg-Anholt. During the rounds of negotiations between, on the one hand, the 
Dutch government and, on the other hand, the German federal government, the Land of 
Lower Saxony and that of the North Rhine–Westphalia, the problem arose of the 
German constitution not permitting citizens to be directly bound by the decisions of a 
cross-border body.50 This might explain why the agreement explicitly excludes the 
cross-border public body being able to enact administrative acts affecting third parties 
and why it states that decisions passed by the cross-border body need to be 
implemented by the parties concerned.51 
 
The discussions raised during the negotiations of the Isselburg-Anholt agreement 
concerning the constitutional legitimacy for Länder to transfer sovereignty powers 
probably led to the addition in 1994 of a new paragraph to Article 24 of the German 
constitution. The new paragraph permits Länder to transfer sovereignty powers to 
transborder territorial organizations provided the federal government gives its assent. 
 
However, when, in 1996, the Mainz agreement was signed between, on the one hand, 
the Land of North Rhine–Westphalia and the Land of Rhineland-Palatinate and, on the 
                                               
47 See Article 3.1 of the Benelux Convention: ―Si les collectivités ou autorités territoriales […] peuvent 
attribuer [au organisme public] des compétences de réglementation et d‘administration‖. It should be 
stressed this is only a possibility left to the subnational units. 
48 See Article 3.5 of the Benelux Convention. 
49 Articles 5 and 6 of the Benelux Convention. 
50 See, K.J. Kraan, ‗The Dutch-German Treaty on cross-border cooperation‘, in Euregio Rhine-Waal (ed.), 
Administrative Organisation of Cross-Border Cooperation conference book (Euregio Rhein Waal, Kleve, 
1994), at 25. 
51 See Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the Isselburg-Anholt Agreement (French translation): (1) ―L‘association 
intercommunale n‘est pas autorisée à imposer des obligation à des tiers au moyen de règles de droit ou 
d‘actes administratifs‖, (2) ―les membres de l‘association intercommunale sont tenus de prendre à l‘égard 
de l‘association, dans le cadre des attributions conférées par le droit interne, les mesures nécessaire à 
l‘exécution de ses taches‖. 
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other hand, the Walloon Region, the German Länder did not make use of Article 24.1 of 
the German constitution.52  
 
Thus, the interstate treaties have progressively provided common substantial regulation 
of public cross-border bodies. However, with the exception of the Benelux Convention, 
they do not allow public cross-border bodies to make and pass general regulations 
directly applicable to the territorial parties involved. As the few applications of Article 5 
of the Additional Protocol to the EOC reveal,53 the trends are still in favour of a ‗dualist‘ 
approach: the public body may make general decisions, but they have no legal effect 
unless the subnational units, parties to the cross-border body, enforce it autonomously 
in their legal system. To this extent, it may be noted that even the EGTC Regulation 
does not alter this scheme, because the EGTC is not empowered to make general 
decisions.54 Most likely, the issuing of general binding acts by a cross-border public 
body is still considered a threat to the national sovereignty principle. 
2.2.3 New actors for CBC? 
 
A third issue that emerges from the examination of the interstate agreements 
concerning CBC regards the type of subnational actors involved in it. More precisely, 
we want to focus here, on the attitude that federate units of federal states have shown in 
relation to CBC.  
 
Usually, these subnational units are vested, according to their domestic constitutional 
provisions, with treaty-making power, a fact that highlights their political relevance and 
their strong degree of autonomy. Precisely for that reason, they may feel uneasy with 
the idea of collaborating with foreign subnational units enjoying only limited powers. 
At the same time, however, it may be disadvantageous for them to not collaborate with 
their foreign counterparts even if they enjoy only limited powers. 
 
This ambivalent attitude of the federate states clearly emerges in the text of some 
interstate agreements. 
 
In the first wave of these international agreements, we may note that federate units are 
not listed among the subnational units to which the treaties‘ provisions apply. The 
                                               
52 For the French text, see Decret 99-1051, 2 July 1998, 8 ―portant assentiment à l‘accord entre le Land de 
Rhénanie du Nord-Westphalie, le Land de Rhénanie-Palatinat, la Région Wallonne et la Communauté 
germanophone de Belgique sur la coopération transfrontalière entre les collectivités territoriales et 
d‘autres instances publiques, signé à Mayence, 8 mars 1996‖, in Moniteur Belge, 13 April 1999. 
53 The Additional Protocol to the EOC provides, in Articles 4 and 5, two different concepts of the 
functioning of the cooperative body entrusted with legal personality. Article 4 follows, according to the 
Explanatory Report (at 23), a ‗double‘ legal logic: if such a body wants to take measures which apply 
generally, it must adopt a decision, which in itself has no legal force, and then each party has to enforce it 
by transposing it in the national legal system to which the party belongs. Article 5.1 follows a different 
model, re-echoing the Benelux Convention. The public law transfrontier cooperation body may take 
action under public law. The act is directly applicable in all territorial communities party to the 
agreement. It should be noted that the Additional Protocol leaves for the national contracting parties the 
possibility of opting for applying Articles 4 or 5 or both. 
54 EGTC Regulation art. 7.4. 
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Benelux Convention (1986), the Isselburg-Anholt agreement (1991) and the Mainz 
agreement (1996) follow this scheme, although the latter two have also been signed by 
the relevant federate units in the exercise of their treaty-making power because of their 
power of regulating local territorial units. 
 
The more recent wave of interstate international agreement (the Karlsruhe Accord, 
1996, the Bruxelles Agreement, 2002) marks a rupture because the federate units, 
although being excluded from the territorial units to which the agreements formally 
apply, are nonetheless allowed to make use of the provisions contained in them.  
 
The Karlsruhe Accord is a good example. It was signed by national states, although 
Switzerland acted on behalf of the relevant Swiss Cantons. Article 2 lists the 
subnational units to which the treaty applies. Neither the Swiss Cantons nor the 
German Länder are included in it. However, Article 2.3 provides the Länder and 
Cantons with the possibility of concluding agreements among themselves and with the 
other subnational local units.55  
 
The Bruxelles Agreement, signed between France, on the one hand, and the Belgian 
government, the Flemish and the Walloon Regions and the French-speaking 
community, on the other hand, is more contradictory. In fact, Article 2.5 explicitly 
excludes the signatory parties from being covered by the provisions of the agreement. 
However, Article 17 states that the agreement is also applicable to the accords 
concluded or participated in by the signatory parties, a wording that could even permit 
France and Belgium to participate in CBC projects. 
 
The involvement in CBC of subnational units, enjoying legislative powers or even 
treaty-making power, can turn out to be a problem for those countries whose 
subnational units are merely entitled to administrative powers. In these cases, 
intervention at the national political level can become convenient, at least when the 
cooperation concerns matters beyond the competences conferred to the domestic 
subnational units56. The ―political backing-up‖ of the central government can also be 
necessary to avoid any potential infringements of the national foreign policy.57 CBC 
                                               
55 Article 2.2 of the Karlsruhe Accord: ―Les Länder […] et les Cantons […] peuvent aussi […] conclure 
entre eux ainsi qu‘avec les collectivités territoriales et organismes public locaux […] des conventions 
dépourvues de caractère de droit international et relatives à des projets de coopération transfrontalière, 
dans la mesure où ces projets relèvent de leurs compétences selon le droit interne et où ils ne 
contreviennent pas à la politique étrangère et en particulier aux engagements internationaux.‖ 
56 See Henry Comte, ―Les acteurs et la légitimité des projets stratégiques transfrontaliers‖, in Comte, 
Levrat, Aux coutures de l’Europe, op. cit. note 11, at 186: ―La reconnaissance du caractère stratégique de tels 
projets transfrontalières soulève, selon noud des question spécifiques. […] D‘une part, les collectivités 
locales concernées ne peuvent prétendre accéder à un véritable capacité d‘action stratégique 
transfrontalière que sur la base d‘une action collective, d‘autre part il parait à tout me moins contre-
productif de mésestimer la nécessaire implication d‘Etats, à travers leur instances locales ou centrales, 
dans la conception et la mise en œuvre de tels projets.‖ 
57 It is interesting to note the different wording used by the Karlsruhe Accord distinguishing by whether 
CBC is conducted by local units or by regional units. Article 1 of the Karlsruhe Accord empowers the 
local territorial units of the Contracting Parties to pursue transfrontier cooperation, provided they 
respect their internal competences and they do not impinge upon the international treaties of the 
Contracting Parties. Article 2.2 (see text at note 45), which deals specifically with Länder and Cantons, 
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may become a highly sensible political issue when it involves subnational units with 
significant economic resources and powers. 
 
Again, the Karlsruhe Accord offers an important example. Article 2(3) gives the French 
prefects the duty of ensuring the cooperation between, on the one hand, German Länder 
and/or Swiss Cantons and, on the other hand, the French territorial communities 
whenever the effectiveness of the transfrontier projects might be undermined because of 
the different powers enjoyed by the parties.58 An analogous provision is set out in the 
Bruxelles Agreement.59 
 
Finally, we may recall the Valencia Treaty between Portugal and Spain.60 It permits 
Spanish and Portuguese subnational units to create cross-border bodies. It is interesting 
to note, however, that there is a clear division between cross-border bodies entrusted 
with public services which enjoy legal capacity, and those institutions deprived of legal 
capacity whose primary aim is the coordination of decision making.61  
 
In relation to the latter type of cross-border body, the treaty enables the Spanish 
Comunidades Autónomas (CC.AA.) to establish such a body only with the Portuguese 
Commissões de Coordinação Regionais, which are decentralized organs of the state.62 This 
is remarkable. Since the Spanish CC.AA. enjoy meaningful powers with no 
correspondence in respect of the Portuguese subnational units, the only level of 
government that can effectively cooperate with the Spanish CC.AA. is the Portuguese 
state itself, even if by means of decentralized organs. 
Thus, two concluding remarks can be made. At a certain point the federate units started 
to consider CBC not only as an instrument used by local bordering subnational units to 
solve their practical administrative problems, but also as an important instrument for 
their regional economic, social and territorial development. Moreover, they understand 
that CBC, instead of the treaty-making power which their constitutions grant to them, 
was an easier way to develop their external action policy.  
 
The involvement of the federate units, enjoying powers, resources and political capacity, 
determined the tendency to develop more-strategic cross-border projects. However, this 
                                                                                                                                            
refers more generally to the politique étrangere, a broader concept that, supposedly, only these territorial 
units can undermine. 
58 Article 2.3 of the Karlsruhe Accord: ―Les représentants de l‘Etat dans les départements et régions 
français sont habilités à étudier avec les autorités compétente des Länder et des Cantons concernés, sans 
porter atteinte au libre exercice de leurs compétences par les collectivités territoriales, les moyens de 
faciliter les initiatives entre les collectivités territoriales françaises d‘une part et les Länder et les cantons 
d‘autre part, lorsque les différence de droit interne entre les Etats concernés en compromettent 
l‘efficacité.‖ 
59 Article 2.3 of the Bruxelles Agreement: ―Les représentant de l‘Etat dans les département et régions 
français et les autorités de l‘Etat fédéral, des communautés et des Régions belges concernées suivent la 
mise en œuvre du présent Accord. Les représentant de l‘Etat dans les départements et régions français 
peuvent également étudier avec ces mêmes autorités les questions de coopération transfrontalière qui 
relèvent en France de la compétence de l‘Etat.‖ 
60 See Marta Sobrido Prieto, ‗El Tratado Hispano-Portugués sobre la cooperación transfronteriza 
territorial‘, in (2004) 8 Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, at 
<http://www.reei.org/reei8/reei8.htm>. 
61 See respectively art. 11 and 10.6 of the Valencia Treaty.  
62 See Article 10.2 of the Valencia Treaty. 
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evolution towards a more strategic CBC can be hindered by the fact that the foreign 
counterparts did not enjoy similar powers. This in turn calls for a more active 
participation of the national state whenever their subnational units are too weak. The 
cases of France and, to a certain extent, Portugal are good examples.  
2.3 The EU Role in CBC: from Financing to Legal Regulation 
 
For a long time, the two driving European supranational forces concerning CBC, 
namely the CoE and the EU, had maintained distinct spheres of action. On the one 
hand, the CoE has been mainly called to set out the legal framework within which to 
develop CBC; on the other hand, the EU has leaned more towards the financing of it.63 
 
The EU intervention in the field dates back to 1990 with the adoption of the 
INTERREG programme. Since its inception, INTERREG was a community initiative 
(CI) programme. This meant the European Commission had more power to define the 
areas of intervention financed by the European Union and the procedural rules to apply. 
The fact that INTERREG was created as a CI programme is important because it 
highlights the political relevance that the European Commission meant to give to the 
development of CBC in Europe.  
 
In general terms, the European cohesion policy has generally been seen as an 
instrument for strengthening the regional dimension of the EU Member States and as a 
way to enhance multilevel governance.64 
 
This general finding can certainly be applied to the case of INTERREG. Nonetheless, it 
must be pointed out that the national states have always been guaranteed a role in the 
INTERREG framework. To this extent, it may be recalled that according to the 
Commission guidelines for the implementation of the INTERREG programmes, the 
proposals, to be submitted to the Commission, had to be prepared by joint cross-border 
or transnational committees constituted by the relevant regional/local and national 
authorities and, where appropriate, by the relevant nongovernmental partners.65 
 
The national state task was mainly that of providing a coordinating framework66, but its 
involvement in the procedural framework for the enactment of the INTERREG 
                                               
63 For this approach, see Nicolas Levrat, ‗La coopération territoriale: adaptation de la coopération 
transfrontalière aux nouveaux territoires du projet européen‘ (2006), 3 Revue des affaires européennes, 495-
509. For a general overview of the EU interventions in the field of CBC see : Michel Casteigts, ‗Cadre 
juridique et enjeux politiques du financement de la coopération transfrontalière en Europe‘, in Yves 
Lejeune (ed.), Le droit des relations transfrontalières, op. cit. note 14, 165-181 ; Committee of the Regions, 
Trans-European Cooperation between Territorial Authorities (CoR Studies, 2/2002). 
64 On the EU cohesion policy and the role of the regions see L. Hooghe and G. Marks, Multi-level 
governance and European Integration (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 2001); S. Leclerc (ed.), 
L’Europe et les régions: quinze ans de cohésion économique et sociale (Bruylant, Bruxelles 2003);  
65 See Communication of the Commission on INTERREG III of 2 September 2004, laying down 
guidelines for a Community initiative concerning trans-European cooperation, INTERREG III, in OJ, 10 
September 2004, C 226, 2 et seq. point 21. 
66 This applies even today in relation to the new objective 3 of the cohesion policy, named ―territorial 
cooperation‖ (see further in this paragraph). See art. 32, c. 2 of the Regulation n. 1083/2006 laying down 
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programme can also be considered as a way to guarantee Member States a look at the 
external activities of their territorial communities, although conducted under the 
reassuring ‗umbrella‘ of European Union law.  
 
However, if we look more carefully at the INTERREG programme the impression is 
that the national state was called to play a more active role. With regard to this 
consideration, it should be noted that the INTERREG programme (at least the latest 
version of it in force during the 2000-2006 period) was structured in three strands:  
―cross border cooperation‖ between neighbouring authorities directed towards local 
authorities; ―transnational cooperation‖ regarding ―cooperation between national, 
regional and local authorities [aimed] to promote a higher degree of territorial 
integration across large groupings of European regions‖; and interregional cooperation, 
intended to create networks for improving development and the cohesion of regions not 
geographically contiguous.67 
 
Whereas ―cross-border cooperation‖ and ―interregional cooperation‖ somehow reflected 
categories already elaborated within the CoE (respectively, transborder cooperation and 
inter-territorial cooperation), transnational cooperation was something new. In fact, this 
form of cooperation relied on an active involvement of both national states and 
subnational units.  
 
Thus, it may be noted that the CBC promoted by the EU level was conceived differently 
in respect of CBC enhanced in the CoE framework. Whereas, in the latter, the role of 
state was conceived in term of exclusion68 (since the non involvement of the national-
level organs was considered a precondition in order to exclude CBC from the realm of 
international relations), in the EU context a logic of inclusion prevailed, with the 
national state actively involved in CBC projects. In fact, besides a local-tailored CBC 
(the cross-border cooperation strand of the INTERREG programme) the EU supported 
a more strategic CBC – namely the transnational cooperation strand of INTERREG – , 
to be enforced within a greater territorial scale and based on projects involving matters 
reserved for the national state or the regional units of highly decentralised states.  
 
These short remarks about the INTERREG programme can help us to clarify better the 
new regulatory framework dealt with by the new European structural funds 
programmes covering the 2007 to 2013 period. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
general provisions on the ERDF, ESF and cohesion funds, in O.J. L.210, 25, according to which the 
operational programme – the document setting out a development strategy to be carried out with the aid 
of a fund – is drawn up by the Member States, though in cooperation with, among others, the relevant 
subnational units. 
67 See Communication from the Commission to the Member States of 2 September 2004, laying down 
guidelines for a Community initiative concerning trans-European cooperation intended to encourage 
harmonious and balanced development of the European territory, INTERREG III, in OJ, 10 September 
2004, C 226, 2 et seq. 
68 It is interesting to note that the signature of Protocol No. 3 of the EOC, which expressly admits 
member states among the potential constituent members of the Euroregional Co-operation Groupings 
(see art. 3 of Protocol No. 3) has changed the original conception of CBC in the CoE context. To this 
extent, it is patent the influence played on this specific issue by the enactment of the EGTC EU 
Regulation. 
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The new programming period is aimed at the simplification and, at the same time, the 
concentration of financial resources as a consequence of the Central and Eastern Europe 
enlargement, which resulted in a substantial widening of the regional disparities, with 
the poorest parts concentrated in the new EU member states. This in turn led the 
Commission to reshape the structure of the structural funds and to abolish CI as the 
INTERREG programme was. 
 
The interest of the European Union in CBC has not yet vanished. On the contrary, it 
gained strategic importance. In fact, the general EC Regulation on structural funds 
created three general objectives to be pursued. The third one—named European 
territorial cooperation—is the new label within which the three previous strands of the 
INTERREG programme—i.e. cross-border cooperation, transnational cooperation and 
interregional cooperation—are revived. 
 
Terms are always important, especially in law. The new territorial cooperation objective 
reflects a new focus of the European cohesion policy. According to the new Article 3.3 
and Article 174.1 of the Lisbon Treaty, the cohesion policy is no longer limited to the 
economic and social dimension; it also includes the ‗territorial‘ one. This change reflects 
the findings of some research showing that the cohesion policy, even in those cases in 
which it has been successfully conducted, has led to an uneven development, with an 
increased growth of the central regions in detriment to the most peripheral ones. A 
more balanced and sustainable development is then suggested. This development should 
benefit the most peripheral regions, called to develop, with their analogous counterparts 
of neighbouring European member states, functional Euroregions, according to a 
multipolar scheme of development.69  
 
This is the background within which the enactment of EGTC Regulation 1082/2006 
must be evaluated. This EGTC Regulation is a sort of break of the previously sketched 
out scheme concerning the respective CoE and EU tasks in CBC. In fact, with the 
adoption of the EGTC Regulation, the European Union played the role of legal 
regulator of CBC, a job that until recently was mainly for the CoE to carry out.  
 
This change was mostly due to the ineffectiveness shown by the CoE‘s instruments. The 
Additional Protocol of the Madrid Convention did in fact provide the territorial 
authorities with the legal possibility to create cross-border bodies. However, it failed to 
provide a common legal framework regulating the creation, since it referred to 
applicable national rules and procedures. The conclusion of bi- or multilateral 
international agreements has solved only part the problem.  
 
The adoption of Regulation 1082/2006 was meant to fill this gap by providing a 
common European legal framework for the setting up of cooperative groupings – 
invested with legal personality – between territorial authorities located on the territory 
of at least two Member States (3.2). The EU intervention, however, has gone a little 
further since the EGTC functioning is not limited to the implementation of territorial 
cooperation projects financed by the European Union, but rather could carry out other 
                                               
69 See Study Group for European Policies (ed.), Territorial Cohesion in Europe (Committee of Regions, 
Office for official publications of European Commission, Luxembourg, 2003). 
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territorial initiatives not financed by it. This goal is framed by the Regulation itself in 
quite strict terms. To this extent it should be recalled that according to art. 7.3 the main 
objective of an EGTC is that of implementing territorial cooperation programmes, 
whereas the possibility to conduct specific actions – a wording suggesting a focus tailored 
activity – other than implementing territorial cooperation programmes is perceived as a 
secondary goal. Moreover, the requirement suggesting that the matters in relation to 
which an EGTC can take action should be common to all the parties can be read as an 
obstacle for developing coordinating CBC of different territorial levels70. 
 
A first survey of the EGTCs set until now in Europe reveals that only few of them 
manage territorial cooperation programmes or projects co-financed by Community 
funds; most of them carry out other territorial cooperation actions without a financial 
contribution from the EU.71 More precisely, by looking at the constitutive documents of 
many EGTCs set thus far, the impression is that the institution of a European grouping 
is a goal per se, as a means to permit future policy coordination, rather than being 
functional to develop a specific CBC project.72 
                                               
70 Art 7.2. ―An EGTC shall act within the confines of the tasks given to it which shall […] be determined 
by its members on the basis that they all fall within the competence of every member under its national 
law‖. The point is addressed by the study conducted by Nicolas Levrat financed by the Committee of the 
Regions (CoR), The European grouping on territorial cooperation (2008) at 88. The text is available at the 
CoR website. 
71 See the own initiative opinion of the Committee of the regions on the new perspectives for the revision 
of the EGTC Regulation, CdR 100/2010 fin, p. 17718/19:  «notes, however, that although the EGTC is 
an institution under Community law created for the express purpose of facilitating territorial cooperation 
within the Union, and it would appear a priori that the regulations governing the Community funds 
favour their use under the objective of European territorial cooperation, the actual facts are quite different 
to the logical and desirable expectations that prompted the Community legislator to take a step of such 
legal significance; confirms, following the wide-reaching prior consultations carried out with 
representatives of the European parliament, the Council and the Commission, and in meeting open not 
only to Committee  members, but also to the different European regional organisations and specialists in 
the field, that only a small number of existing EGTCs manage territorial cooperation programmes or 
projects that are cofinanced by Community funds; avers that most of the existing EGTCs carry out other 
specific territorial cooperation actions without a financial contribution from the Union, in keeping with 
the second paragraph of art. 7(3) of Regulation 8EC) No 1082/2006». The document is available at 
<http://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/SiteCollectionDocuments/opinion%20nunez/cdr100-
2010_fin_ac_en.pdf>. 
72 See for example art. 3 of the West Vlaanderen/Fiandre-Dunkerque-Côte d‘Opale EGTC convention 
according to which: «Le G.E.C.T. a pour mission principale de promouvoir et de soutenir une coopération 
transfrotalière efficace et cohérente au sein de son territoire et à ce titre exerce les missions suivantes: à 
l‘intérieur du périmètre de référence : 1. assurer la coordination et favoriser la mise en réseau de tous les 
membres du GECT et, d‘une manière générale, de tout organisme dont l‘intervention est de nature à 
rendre pertinente, cohérente et efficace la coopération transfrontalière sur le périmètre du Gect ; 2. 
assurer la représentation et la concertation politique du territoire, 3. définir des stratégies et des 
programmes d‘action communs pour répondre aux besoins des habitants du territoire, 4 définir et réaliser 
des projets communs ; 5. développer toutes formes d‘actions qui concourent au développement de la 
coopération transfrontalière entre les acteurs de ce territoire, avec une attention particulière pour la 
coopération transfrontalière dans la région frontalière de proximité. A l‘échelle régionale, nationale et 
européenne. 6. assurer la représentation du territoire vis-à-vis des instance tierces». Given the vague 
wording used and the mention, among the objectives, of the political coordination of the territorial units 
concerned it is not by chance that among the constitutive members there are also the national states. 
See also the instituting convention of the Pyrénées-Méditerranée EGTC (made up of the Spanish CCAA 
of Balers islands and Catalonia, French region Midi Pyrénées and Languedoc Rossilon): «Le Gect 
―Pyrénées –Méditeranée a comme object d‘assurer la realisation des projet de cooperation territoriale qui 
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In this context, where EGTCs are increasingly considered as policy-making institutions 
rather than (or at least less) operative instruments, it is not surprisingly that art. 3 of 
the EGTC Regulation includes Member States among the prospective members of an 
European grouping.  
 
The involvement of the state, along with local and regional authorities, has been defined 
as a ―Copernican revolution‖ in the field of CBC, since, as already noted, according to 
the CoE acquis, the state should have a role only as a regulator of CBC and not as an 
actor directly involved in it.73 
 
However in the light of the previous experiences of the INTERREG programme, it 
comes as no surprise to see that the national state can play an active role in territorial 
cooperation. 
 
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the involvement of the state as a potential actor in 
CBC is becoming increasingly relevant. It is seen as necessary for developing cross-
border projects on a larger territorial scale and having their focus on very strategic 
matters, usually reserved for the state. This is the case of the creation of the European 
transport corridors (particularly the cross-border section), protection and management 
of river basins or coastal zones, public health services, the strengthening of polycentric 
development, etc. 
 
This kind of CBC—which entails the involvement of territorial actors having a ‗strong‘ 
political capacity (national state but also regions)—is likely to be the focus of the EU 
strategy on territorial cooperation. Because of the decreasing amount of available 
resources, it is mandatory to concentrate them in very specific and strategic projects. 
 
There is important evidence of this trend: the recent EU strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region, which was the first application of the ―macroregion‖ concept. Following a 
request advanced at the European Council of 14 December 2007, the European 
Commission adopted a communication in which it calls for a coordinating action by 
Member States, regions, the European Union, financing institutions and 
nongovernmental bodies, finalized to promote a more balanced development of the 
Baltic Sea Region.74 The Commission intends to have a role that goes beyond the 
monitoring of the implementation of the funding programmes. For the practical 
implementation of the strategy, the Commission explicitly calls for the concentration of 
all available structural funds—including those meant for territorial cooperation—in 
order to implement actions foreseen in the strategy.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
seront approuvés par les members de l‘Euroregion. Le Gect a pour objectif de réaliser et de gérer, dans 
une perspective de développement durable, les projets et actions de coopération territoriale approuvès par 
ses membres agissant dans le cadre de leurs compétences»  
73 See Committee of the Regions (CoR), The European grouping on territorial cooperation (2008) study 
conducted by Nicolas Levrat et al, at 100.  
74 Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, concerning the European 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, Brussels, 10 June 2009, COM (2009) 248 final. 
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The Baltic Sea Region is considered by the Commission as an example of a 
―macroregion‖, i.e. ―an area covering a number of administrative regions but with 
sufficient issues in common to justify a single strategy approach‖.75 The emergence of 
the macroregion concept in the EU territorial cooperation policy highlights the 
necessity to develop an institutional and political strategy with the objective to produce 
a framework permitting interaction and participation of promoting members state, of 
various regions, together with EU institutions. The recent emergence of an EU 
strategy for the Danube Region reveals that that macroregion is going to be crucial for 
the European cohesion policy. 
 
Thus, CBC in the European context is likely to be less spontaneous than it was 
previously. The bottom-up pushes for external actions will probably be canalized in a 
common frame defined by vertical political actors, mainly the EU and the States. The 
role of regions and other territorial actors will be proportionate to their political 
capacity to be influential in this established framework.  
3. The Role of the National State in the European Law of CBC 
 
In the previous section, we take into account the two harmonizing dynamics present 
today in Europe in the field of CBC: the CoE and the European Union.  
Although the trend towards the creation of an harmonised European law on CBC is 
incontestable, we cannot underestimate the still-relevant influence that national legal 
orders play in the issue. As mentioned in the introduction, both the EGTC Regulation 
and the Protocol No. 3 to the EOC emphasise the regulatory role of the national state 
not only by remitting to specific domestic legal provisions whenever common rules are 
lacking but also by granting national states wide discretionary power in relation to the 
setting of the EGTC and the ECG. They do so by mentioning concepts such as national 
public interest and public policy  whose enforcement is almost entirely based on political 
evaluations which are in turn influenced by the general attitudes of the state towards 
CBC. 
 
To this extent, the present and the next paragraphs are meant to provide an analysis of 
the different approaches national states have shown in regard to CBC.  
 
The examination relies on the comparative method. The relevant national legal orders 
are not assessed case by case. Rather, it is preferred to enucleate some key points 
considered particularly influential in respect to the attitude a national state can assume 
towards CBC. These are: the type of decentralisation, the intergovernmental relation 
between the national state and the subnational territorial level, the presence of ethic 
minorities along the borders, the ―conditionality‖ in countries of transition and, where 
relevant, the judicial cases. On the basis of this analysis and relying on empirical 
experiences of some national states, taken as paradigmatic, the next paragraph will 
suggest a classification of the model of the national attitudes towards CBC. 
                                               
75 Ibid., at 6. 
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3.1 Types of Decentralization 
 
One issue to take into consideration concerns the question of whether there is a direct 
relation between the type of decentralization and the power of subnational units to act 
‗externally‘.76 Because CBC is generally seen as a means of enhancing the self-
government rights of the territorial units, one could assume that in those countries in 
which a ‗strong‘ decentralization is enacted, with subnational units at the regional level 
enjoying legislative powers, the national state‘s attitude towards CBC should be 
favorable and in principle more encouraging than in those countries that apply more-
limited forms of decentralization (i.e. administrative types). 
 
However, even a quick look at the relevant domestic legal systems seems to seriously 
make us question the grounds of the assumption. 
 
If, on the one hand, we consider the case of France—a state well known for its 
centralistic distribution of territorial powers (although recently eased by the 2003 
constitutional reform77)—we would probably be surprised by the number of legislative 
acts passed with the aim of enhancing CBC78.  Furthermore, if we look at the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe—where local democracy is recent and uneven—we quite 
surprisingly find that the constitutions of both Poland and Hungary confer their 
territorial communities ―the right to join international association of local and regional 
communities as well as cooperate with local and regional communities of other states‖.79 
 
On the other hand, we can mention the cases of both Italy and Spain, two states which 
present a strong degree of decentralization but for whom the acceptance as legitimate of 
‗external‘ actions conducted at the regional level has been difficult.80 
 
The case of Austria is also important. Despite the fact that Austria is usually classified 
as a federal system, it is often argued that it is structured as a strong regionalized 
system.81 This is well reflected in the legal and political ability of the Länder to act 
internationally. Unlike in other federal legal systems, which usually grant the federate 
states the treaty making power, the Austrian constitution did not originally provide the 
Länder with this power. Following the Länder‘s push for a strengthening of their 
constitutional autonomy, a constitutional amendment was passed in 1988 that 
established their treaty-making power. Article 16 of the Austrian federal constitution 
establishes that the Länder, within their own sphere of competence, may conclude 
treaties with states or their constituent states bordering Austria. The provision, 
                                               
76 See Renaud Dehousse, Fédéralisme et relations internationales (Bruylant, 1991) at 116: ―Dans une large 
mesure l‘action internationale des régions sera fonction de la manière dont elles se définissent par rapport 
à l‘Etat dans son ensemble et de leur perception des liens qui les unissent aux autorités nationales.‖ 
77 See Michael Vepeaux, Les collectivités territoriales en France (Dalloz, 2004); Olivier Gohin, ‗La nouvelle 
décentralisation et la réforme de l‘Etat en France‘, in (2003) 3 Actualité Juridique de Droit Administratif , 
522-528.  
78 For more details on the French legal interventions on the matter see part II, lett. A, 1. 
79 See Article 171 of the Polish constitution and Article 44(a) of the Hungarian constitution. 
80 See later in the text. 
81 Peter Pernthaler, Anna Gamper, ‗National federalism within the EU: the Austrian experience‘, in 
Sergio Ortino, Mitja Ž agar, Vojtech Mastny, The Changing Faces of Federalism (Manchester University 
Press, 2005), 132-155. 
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however, states that any agreement—including transfrontier cooperation agreements, 
according to the federal government82—must have prior expressed approval by the 
federal government. In particular the federal government must be informed before 
negotiations begin, and the authorization must be signed by the President of the 
Republic, following a recommendation from the Land government, and countersigned 
by the president of the Land.83  
 
Until now, Article 16 of the Austrian constitution has never been enforced. This does 
not mean that the Austrian Länder have never been involved in CBC. When not based 
on the EC framework of INTERREG programmes, CBC has been developed by means 
of Article 17 of the Austrian constitution. This provision allows Länder to make use of 
all forms of private law, including financing projects, in all matters even of the national 
state, without being restricted by the distribution of competences. This constitutional 
provision—which serves as a safety valve against the severe centralization of 
competences in Austria84—has been the instrument that allows the Länder to develop 
external relations, bypassing the strict procedural rules set in Article 16.85 It is worth 
noting that even though a same provision was meant to deal with both treaty-making 
power and the other external relations of Länder (Art.16), the practice led to 
distinguishing the two categories, with CBC enacted by means of Article 17 of the 
constitution and with the treaty-making power not enforced by the Länder. 
 
In the light of this scenario, shall we then assume that the type of decentralization is 
irrelevant when assessing the state‘s policy towards CBC? I do not believe so. The fact 
that CBC is being pursued by institutional subjects enjoying legislative powers, who are 
exercising influential political capacity with autonomous resources, creates a breach in 
respect to the traditional, locally tailored CBC. In fact, the external conduct of ‗strong‘ 
regions may undermine the coherence of both the national general policy and the 
foreign policy. This may lead to a more cautious approach towards CBC from the 
national state. 
 
To this extent, it is worth considering that in some countries in which the regional level 
enjoys legislative competences, the regional external action, including CBC, is very 
often treated (or has been originally treated) —by the constitution itself or by the 
interpretation currently given by the national-level administration—as if it were 
                                               
82 See Council of Europe, Transfront (2005/2), Report on the current state of the administrative and legal 
framework of transfrontier cooperation in Europe (updated 15 March 2005), 22. ―The law [Art. 16 Cost. 
N.A.] does, however, state that any agreement—including, therefore, transfrontier agreement—must 
have the prior express approval of the federal government […] The Lander feel that such a complicated 
procedure somewhat limits their ability to enter into transfrontier cooperation agreements.‖ The data 
concerning the Austrian case have been provided by the federal chancellery. The report is available at 
<https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImag
e=1324633&SecMode=1&DocId=1342918&Usage=2>. 
83 See Wolfang Burtscher, ‗La acción exterior de los Länder austríacos y su participación en la celebración 
de tratados internacionales‘, in Manuel Perez Gonzales (ed.), La acción exterior de los Lander, Regiones, 
Cantones y Comunidades Autonomas (IVAP, 1994), 147-170.; Theo Öhlinger, ‗Le competenze dei Länder e 
dei comuni austriaci in tema di attività internazionali‘, in Andrea de Guttry, Natalino Ronzitti, I rapporti 
di vicinato tra Italia e Austria (Giuffrè, 1987), 71-94. 
84 Pernthaler and Gamper, National federalism,  op. cit. note 81, at 140. 
85 Peter Pernthaler, Lo stato federale differenziato (Il Mulino, 1998), 68 -73. 
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conduct comparable to the use of treaty-making power rather than as a way to promote 
their self-government rights, despite the fact that the Explanatory Report to the EOC 
(point 35a) excludes that CBC may entail any international liability of the state as a 
whole. 
 
To give some examples, one can mention Article 117.9 of the Italian constitution, as 
amended in 2001, which grants the Regions the power to conclude, in the same 
provision, both international treaties and agreements with a foreign counterpart, 
though remitting to a statute that nonetheless regulates distinctively the two 
hypothesis. 
 
In similar terms, according to the Austrian federal government interpretation and the 
current practice, Article 16 of the Constitution applies not only to international treaties, 
but even to transfrontier cooperation agreements signed by the Austrian Länder.  
Finally, even in Germany, at least until the decision of the German Constitutional 
Tribunal on the Kehl Port,86 the federal government argued that Article 32 of the 
German Basic law (GG)—a provision expressly dealing with the Länder‘s treaty-
making power—applied even to the Länder‘s CBC agreements.87 
 
A possible explanation for this is that any external relation of ‗strong‘ subnational units, 
being it an exercise of their treaty making power or CBC agreements, may potentially 
undermine the consistency of the foreign policy and the general policy of the national 
state.  
 
Thus, both in regional and federal states, the external conduct of the regional 
subnational units is enforced according to procedures that, formally or informally, grant 
the national authorities some discretionary evaluation over the respect of the national 
foreign policies and general interests. However, it should be noted that the extent and 
the nature of this control is also deeply influenced by the type of intergovernmental 
relations among territorial units and the national state.  
                                               
86 BVerfGE 2, 347 (374). In 1951, the Land Baden and the Strasbourg Port Authority signed an 
agreement concerning the joint administration of the Kehl Port. The German federal government gave 
its consent to the agreement, assuming that Article 32 of the German constitution (Grundgesetz GG) 
applied. However the national Parliament deemed the whole procedure void because, according to Article 
59 of the GG, the signing of an international treaty is subject to the consent of both Bundestag and 
Bundesrat. The Constitutional Tribunal took a different view. The agreement was not an international 
agreement since it was concluded with a non state subject. Thus, Article 32 of GG did not apply. This 
meant that not only did the Parliament not have a say in the procedure, but also that the previous consent 
of the central government was not needed. Thus, when the Länder engage in agreements with foreign 
counterparts, they may freely act without even the previous consent of the central government, although 
the principle of federal loyal collaboration should be respected. The Decision of the German 
Constitutional Court is analysed by : Nicolas Schmitt, L’émergence du régionalisme cooperative en Europe, 
(edit. Universitaire Fribourg, 2002), at 172- 182. 
87 Article 32.3 of the German constitution: ―In so far as the Lander have power to legislate, they may 
conclude treaties with foreign states, with the consent of the federal government‖. 
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3.2 Intergovernmental Relations 
 
Another issue we should keep in mind when evaluating the national-level attitude 
towards CBC is the type of relations between the national state and the subnational 
units of regional level.  
 
In a context in which intergovernmental relations are based on a cooperative scheme, it 
is likely that CBC will be assessed according to the same paradigm and thus 
progressively being considered as a way for subnational units to exercise their self-
government rights. On the contrary, where the intergovernmental relations are based 
on more-competitive terms, the policy of the national state towards CBC might be more 
cautious, and therefore stricter forms of national supervision are likely to occur. 
 
As an example of cooperative intergovernmental relations, we can consider the cases of 
Germany88 and Switzerland.89 Both countries are, as is well known, federal states whose 
constitutions grant to Länder and Cantons treaty-making power. However, in both 
cases, the federal state retains the power of supervision in order to avoid a possible 
conflict with national foreign policy.90 The current practice shows that both the Länder 
and Cantons rarely use their treaty-making power. In fact, according to the usual 
pattern of cooperative federalism, both the Länder and Cantons have agreed to renounce 
their use of treaty-making power, in favour of the national state, in exchange for a 
political commitment of the national state itself to consult and to take in due account the 
interests of regional units when defining and conducting foreign policy.91 In 
Switzerland, the duty of involving the Cantons in the definition of the confederation‘s 
foreign policy was formalised in the 2000 constitutional text codifying a lasting and 
previous institutional practice.92 
                                               
88 The concept of cooperative federalism is explored by Constance Grewe, Le fédéralisme coopérative en 
République Fédérale d’Allemagne (Economica, Paris, 1981); Raffaele Bifulco, La cooperazione nello stato 
unitario composto (Cedam, Padova, 1995). 
89 See René Rhinow, ―Le fédéralisme Suisse: l‘approche juridique‖, in René L. Frey, Georg Kreis, Gian 
Reto Plattner, René Rhinow (eds.), Le fédéralisme suisse. La réforme engagée. Ce qui reste à faire (Presse 
Politechniques et Universitaires, Lausanne, 2006), 64 et seq. 
90 See Article 32 of German Basic Law. As far as Switzerland is concerned, Article 56 of the Swiss 
constitution (2000) establishes that the Cantons can conclude treaties in areas falling under their 
jurisdiction, provided they are not in breach of federal law and of the interest of the confederation and of 
the rights of the other cantons. The Cantons are required to inform federal authorities before concluding 
international treaties. The federal government or another Canton may oppose this agreement. In such a 
case, it is up to the national parliament to decide. Finally, the Cantons can directly deal with lower-
ranking foreign authorities, whereas it is up to the confederation to conduct relations with foreign states 
on behalf of the Cantons.  
91 In Germany, the issue is still regulated by a gentlemen‘s agreement (so-called Lindau Agreement), 
which dates back to 1957, between the Länder and the federal government. In 1993, an attempt to 
formalize the agreement in the text of the federal constitution failed because of the Länders‘ 
disagreement. See Uwe Leonardy, ‗Federation and Länder in German Foreign Relations: Power-Sharing 
in Treaty-Making and European Affairs‘, in Foreign Relations and Federal States, (Londres/New York 
1993), 236. 
92 Art 55 of the Constitution states: ―Les Cantons sont associés à la préparation des décisions de politique 
extérieure affectant leurs compétences ou leurs intérêts essentiels. La Confédération informe les Cantons 
en temps utile et de manière détaillée et elle les consulte. L‘avis des Cantons revêt un poids particulier 
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Thus, it is in a context highly characterised by a cooperative pattern that we should 
evaluate the policy of Switzerland93 and Germany towards CBC. 
 
The recognition of such power is based on Länder and Cantons‘ constitutional self-
government rights. The ratification of the EOC and the subsequent Protocols gave it a 
further formal legal basis.94 In both countries, there are no provisions concerning a 
supervision power of the central government in relation to CBC or other external 
relations not of an international nature conducted by the Länder and Cantons.95 The 
external relations must, however, take place respecting the general principle of the loyal 
cooperation characterizing the intergovernmental relations between the central and the 
regional tier of government.  
 
Thus, although at the beginning the CBC conducted by the Länder and Cantons were 
somehow assimilated to their international treaty making power, later on CBC was 
progressively considered more as an exercise of self-government rights - to be dealt 
with according to public internal law - rather than as an issue involving an international 
law dimension. In the case of Germany this evolution has certainly been favoured by the 
decision of the constitutional tribunal on the Kehl port. 
 
However, the role of the two national states must not be underestimated. In fact, both 
states have always guaranteed their commitment to develop the CBC of their 
subnational units. This has been done especially by concluding international interstate 
                                                                                                                                            
lorsque leurs compétences sont affectées. Dans ces cas, les Cantons sont associés de manière appropriée 
aux négociations internationales‖. See also Loi fédérale du 22 décembre 1999 sur la participation des cantons à 
la politique extérieure de la Confédération. 
93 To this regard, Yves Lejeune, ‗La surveillance des relations internationales conventionnelles des 
collectivités fédérées (Les exemples de la Belgique et de la Suisse)‘, in Carlos Fernandez de Casadevante 
Romani (ed.), L’Etat et la coopération transfrontalière, op. cit. note 13, 105-129, at 121, notes : « l‘assemblée 
fédérale n‘a jamais eu à approuver un traité cantonal dont le conseil fédéral ne voulait pas. Eu égard à la 
grande courtoise dont sont empreintes les relations entre la Confédération et les Cantons, l‘opinion di 
Conseil fédéral est toujours prise en considération ». On this issue see also Sergio Gerotto, ‗Il potere 
estero dei cantoni svizzeri: un giusto equilibrio tra autonomia e partecipazione?‘ (2004) Diritto pubblico 
comparato ed europeo, 2, 701-716. 
94 It should be noted that in both Germany and Switzerland the regional levels have jurisdiction in 
dealing with municipalities. This means that forms and limits of municipal CBC are set in regional law. 
However, since both Switzerland and Germany signed the EOC and the following Protocols—and other 
relevant international treaties as well—the primacy of international law over domestic law means the 
municipalities could not be prevented from taking part in CBC. 
95 In Switzerland, however, according to the information provided by the Swiss Confederation, the 
conclusion of cantonal transfrontier agreements should follow the same procedure set in relation to the 
cantonal international treaties. This means the Cantons are required to inform federal authorities before 
concluding transfrontier agreements. In case the confederation or another canton disagree, the agreement 
is submitted to the national parliament. See Council of Europe, Report on the current state of the 
administrative and legal framework of transfrontier cooperation, op. cit. note 82, at 93. See also art. 61c and 62 
of the ―Loi sur l‘organisation du gouvernemnt et de l‘administration‖ as emended in 2005, according to 
which the procedure above described applies to the agreements concluded by Cantons ―avec l’étranger‖, a 
wording broad enough to include CBC agreement. According to some scholars, however, the procedure—
now set in Article 56 of the federal constitution—applies only to the international treaties concluded by 
the Cantons, and not to the transfrontier agreements with no international value. See Nicolas Michel, La 
acción exterior de los Cantones suizos y su participation en la celebración de tratados internacionales, in Perez 
Gonzales, La acciòn exterior, op. cit. note 83, at 201. 
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agreements favouring CBC or by establishing intergovernmental commissions which 
permitted the connection of both national and regional levels.96 
 
Let us now consider examples of highly decentralised states (both federal and regional) 
whose internal intergovernmental relations cannot be easily assessed according to the 
cooperative scheme characterising Germany and Switzerland.  
The first case is Belgium. Here, treaty-making power for Regions and Communities was 
introduced in the 1980s, but it was formally enshrined in the constitution only in 1993.  
 
The specificity of the Belgian case is shown by the fact that Belgian Regions and 
Communities tend to use the international-treaty instrument frequently. The reason for 
that is clear: they want to promote themselves as a quasi-formal state, somehow 
politically competing with the central government. The use of the foreign power by the 
Regions and Communities is often a way to highlight their political distinctiveness in 
respect to the federal state97. 
 
In this framework, some procedural mechanisms have been set to regulate the treaty-
making power of the Regions and the Communities. However, the established 
procedural mechanism is more an instrument of loose coordination, rather than that of 
effective cooperation, between territorial levels. In fact, Article 81 of the Special Law of 
Institutional Reforms gives the federal government the power to prevent a Region or a 
Community from signing an international treaty. However, this may only occur after 
the failure of the attempt to reach a compromise and in very specific circumstances,98 
such as the breaching of previous international treaties which could expose Belgium to 
international liability or the signing of a treaty with a state not internationally 
recognised by Belgium or with whom the diplomatic relations are suspended. Thus, by 
specifically listing the narrow circumstances that allow the national state to intervene, it 
is clear the intention is to avoid the national authorities enjoying a too wide discretion 
in establishing the limits of the Belgian Regions‘ and Communities‘ foreign power.99 
 
                                               
96 See paragraph IV for practical examples. 
97 A recent indicator of this trend is the Benelux Treaty of Economic Union signed in 2008. In 1958 a 
first treaty between the Benelux countries was signed, establishing a Benelux Economic Union for a 50-
year period. In June 2008, a new Benelux treaty was signed, with the objective, inter alia, to strengthen 
CBC at any level. However, this reference has to be read as referring to local territorial authorities. In 
fact, all Belgian Regions and Communities are signatories parties of the new Benelux treaty, thus 
showing  how Belgian Regions and Communities prefer to utilize international law instruments in order 
to cooperate with their neighbours. 
98 See Bart Kerremans, Jan Beyers, ‗The Belgian sub-national entities in the European Union: second or 
third level players‘, Regional and Federal Studies, 6 (2), 41-55, at 43. 
99 See Yves Lejeune, ‗La surveillance des relations internationales conventionnelles des collectivités 
fédérées (Les exemples de la Belgique et de la Suisse)‘, in C. de Casadevante Romani, L’Etat et la 
coopération transfrontalière, op. cit., note 13, at 126-127, ―La Belgique n‘a pas instauré un contrôle central 
contraignant de l‘opportunité de l‘activité internationale de ses collectivités composantes. C‘est d‘ailleurs 
le seul Etat fédéral qui s‘y soit refusé. Le conseil des ministres belge ne peut décider la suspension de la 
négociation ou de l‘exécution d‘un traité d‘une Communauté ou d‘une Région qu‘en invoquant l‘excès de 
pouvoir, c'est-à-dire la violations des règles fixant le conditions précises de constitutionalité ou de légalité 
de pareil traité‖. The Author further remarks (126): ―L‘autonomie internationale des Communautés et des 
Régions belges apparaît beaucoup plus grande que celles des Cantons suisses. Elle résulte du système de 
gestion consensuelle de la politique extérieure sur un pied de stricte égalité entre l‘Autorité fédérale et les 
autorités fédérées‖. 
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As far as CBC is concerned the basic idea is that it is part of the self-government rights 
pertaining to regional or local subnational units and because of that no national 
authorisation is required. For a long time, Regions and Communities have considered 
CBC as something reserved for local units. This is reflected by the international 
agreements concerning transfrontier cooperation signed by Belgium, which, as we have 
seen, does not apply to the Regions and Communities (Benelux Convention, Mainz 
Agreement). According to some scholars the increasing interest of the Regions and the 
Communities in CBC emerged when the EC started to fund the INTERREG 
programme.100 In fact, the more recent Bruxelles Agreement reveals a change of 
attitude with Belgian Regions and Communities explicitly entitled to conclude CBC 
agreements.  
 
Thus, in Belgium, due to the fragile institutional equilibrium existing among the 
constituent units of the state, a procedural framework is set to the limited extent of 
regulating the treaty-making power, whereas the other external conducts, as CBC, are 
not regulated at all since they are considered an exercise of the self-government rights 
of the subnational units. Moreover, the cases justifying a barring intervention of the 
federal state are narrowly construed and do not include clauses such as general interest 
or foreign policy. 
 
The cases of Italy and Spain present a common pattern. In both Italy and Spain101 a 
highly formalized procedure applies in such a way that any external action is actually 
treated, from a substantial point of view, as if it were almost a use of the treaty-making 
power. The control exerted by the national state involves not only legal but political 
evaluation. The priority for the national state is to ensure that the national foreign 
policy and the national interest are not affected by the external conducts of the regional 
subnational units. This attitude has been certainly favored by the fact that, unlikely 
federal states, whose constitution usually recognize the treaty making power to federate 
units, these legal system102, though highly decentralized, do not, or at least did not 
originally, admit any rooms for the external action of the regional levels since the 
external relations were seen as an activity strictly pertaining to the national state.103. In 
both states, however, the claims of the regional territorial level for the entitlement of 
such a power have been successfully conducted before Constitutional Courts which have 
nonetheless considered their power to act externally as a derogation to the otherwise 
national competence in foreign affairs, thus to be narrowly construed.104 
                                               
100 Yves Lejeune, ―L‘action extérieure des régions et des communautés belges et leur participation à la 
conclusion de traités internationaux‖, in Perez Gonzales, La acción exterior, op. cit. note 83, at 514. 
101 For a detailed analysis of the Spanish case concerning CBC, see Susana Beltrán García, Los acuerdos 
exteriores de las comunidades autónomas españolas (Universidat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2001) and Carlos 
Fernàndez de Casadevante Romani, La acción exterior de las Comunidades Autónomas: Balance de una práctica 
consolidada (editorial Dilex, 2001). 
102 This is also the case of Austria that although usually considered as a federal state did not provide, until 
the Constitutional Amendment in 1988 which inserts art. 16, any international making power to the 
Austrian Länder.  
103 See Antonio La Pergola, ―Regionalismo, federalismo e potere estero dello Stato. Il caso italiano e il 
diritto comparato‖, in Antonio La Pergola, Tecniche costituzionali e problemi delle autonomie «garantite» 
(Cedam, 1987), 91-93. 
104 When they first faced cases concerning the legitimacy of external conduct of the regional level, both 
constitutional courts adopted a strict scrutiny of review, in fact reaffirming the national state as the sole 
institution able to legitimately conduct international actions. However, the increasing spread of CBC 
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The competitive intergovernmental relations between national state and regional 
level,105 the tendency of the regional level to put emphasis on CBC as a way to promote 
political distinctiveness, the burdensome procedures enforced by the national states in 
order to permit CBC of regional actors are all factors that have not favoured an easy 
recognition of CBC. 
 
To this regard, a first important indicator is the enforcement of the CoE‘s acquis. Both 
countries ratified the EOC but not the Additional Protocol and Protocol No. 2. The 
failed ratification of the Additional Protocol, which deals with the creation of cross-
border bodies, is meaningful because it shows the hostility of the two states to admitting 
a stable and lasting institutionalization of CBC.  
 
Italy, when depositing the instruments of ratification of the EOC, issued two 
declarations revealing the severe policy of the national state in relation to CBC. First, 
the application of the EOC was subject to the conclusion of interstate agreements. 
Second, the Italian territorial authorities were empowered to conclude transfrontier 
agreements provided they were situated within 25 km of the border. Both these 
limitations are included in the national law enforcing the EOC, still in force. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
practice, the signature of the EOC, and the quite ambiguous policy of the national states towards such 
regional conduct are all reasons I believe explain why the two constitutional courts applied, at a later 
stage, a more lenient standard of review. 
To this regard, as far as the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal is concerned, decision 165/1994 was a 
turning point. Somehow overruling the already mentioned previous 137/1989 decision, the Spanish 
Constitutional Tribunal held that, in consideration of their constitutional autonomy, the CC.AA. are 
empowered to conduct external activities, provided these activities do not imply any exercise of an 
international jus contrahendi, nor that they determine immediately enforceable obligations towards foreign 
public powers, and nor do they breach central government foreign policy. This means that the external 
activities should take place according to a procedural regulatory framework permitting the national state 
to avoid possible clashes with the national foreign policy. 
In Italy, the landmark decision is 189/1987. The constitutional court started its reasoning by affirming 
that in principle the national state has the exclusive power in relation to foreign policy. The legislator can 
provide exceptions to this general rule, which must be constructed narrowly. Among the activities having 
an external character a Region could perform, the constitutional court distinguished between, on the one 
hand, the transfrontier promotional activities (attività promozionali) and, on the other hand, a broader 
category called attività di mero rilievo internazionale. The first group includes activities aimed at the social, 
economic and cultural development of the Regions. According to the constitutional court the attività 
promozionali—which also includes the crossborder agreements concluded under the umbrella of the 
EOC—require the previous consent of the central government (and the consistency with national 
guidelines) because they are to be considered, in any case, as binding agreements supposedly affecting the 
international liability of the state as a whole. The other category, the so-called attività di mero rilievo 
internazionale, includes a plurality of activities characterized by the fact they do not create legally binding 
obligations, but merely political commitments, and, therefore, because they are not able to affect the 
international liability of the state, they are subject to a less formalized authorization regime. 
105 To this extent, it is worth noting that both Italy and Spain lack a legislative chamber in which regional 
interests are effectively represented, as usually happens in federal states. As far as Italy is concerned, this 
led to the creation, by statute, of the Conferenza Stato Regioni, a forum in which representatives of the 
central government and regions meet to even their relations. In Spain the need for cooperative relations 
led to the creation of intergovernmental commissions with a sector-tailored focus. However, the historical 
CC.AA. (Galicia, Catalonia, Pais Vascos) especially tend to favour direct relationships with the central 
government, rather than match up with the other CC.AA., in order to claim more powers and resources. 
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The case of Spain is slightly different. At the time of the signature of the EOC, Spain 
issued a declaration according to which the EOC application was subject to the previous 
conclusion of an interstate agreement. However, lacking this international agreement, 
subnational units could nonetheless conclude transfrontier agreements provided that 
the express consent of the governments of both national parties involved was given. 
 
In 1995, the Treaty of Bayonne, concerning transfrontier cooperation, was signed 
between Spain and France. In 1997 a decree (n. 1137) dealing with the procedure to be 
followed for transfrontier agreements of subnational agreement was issued. The decree 
provides a different regulatory framework depending on the legal context within which 
the agreement is concluded. For those transfrontier agreements concluded under the 
umbrella of an international treaty (as was the case along the French–Spanish border 
but not along the Portuguese one), the express consent of the national state was 
replaced by a simple duty of communication in order to permit control of the legitimacy 
of the agreement with reference to both the EOC and the relevant bilateral treaty. The 
recent Treaty of Seville between Spain and Portugal has allowed for the extension of 
the above-mentioned procedure for transfrontier agreements concluded by Spanish and 
Portuguese subnational units, for which the express consent of the central government 
was previously required.  
 
The Royal Decree, however, only applies to transfrontier cooperation.106 No regulatory 
framework is set for the other external conduct of CC.AA., such as interregional 
agreements or the joining of European frontier-region associations. Nonetheless, these 
activities can be considered legitimate in the light of the tribunal constitutional‘s case 
law, which, however, requires a duty of loyal collaboration between the two territorial 
levels of government. 
 
In Italy, following the constitutional reform in 2001, Article 117.9 of the constitution 
established that the Regions have the power to conclude international agreements 
(accordi) with a foreign state and understandings (intese) with constituent parts of a 
state. A statute (no. 131/2003) was passed to enforce the new constitutional provisions. 
The statute provides two different procedures for the conclusion respectively of the 
international agreements and of the understandings a Region can come down to with its 
territorial counterparts. As far as the latter, the procedure echoes a previous regulatory 
framework set in 1994.107 These understandings, aimed at promoting the social, 
                                               
106 See Javier A. Gonzáles Vega, ‗El real decreto 1317/1997 de 1 de agosto sobre comunicación previa y 
publicación official de los convenios de cooperación transfronteriza. Via libre por fin a la cooperación 
transfronteriza?‘ (1997) Revista Española Derecho International 49 (2), 349-355. 
107 This was set in Decreto Presidente della Repubblica (31 marzo 1994), which provided a different 
procedure to be followed depending on the nature of the regional external conduct. If the latter implied 
the conclusion of binding agreements (attività promozionali), the previous explicit consent of the national 
state was required, to permit control over the respect of the national foreign policy. For other less 
relevant external conduct (attività di mero rilievo internazionale), such as visits, meetings, conferences, 
participation in cultural social, and economic activities, a simple duty of informing the central government 
was required. Such an act was passed in order to enforce a decision of the Italian Constitution Court (see 
later in the text). For comments on the Regulation of the Italian regional external power before the 
constitution amendment in 2001, see Francesco Palermo, Il potere estero delle regioni, (Cedam, Padova, 
1999), 170-188; Isabella Pasini, ‗«Potere estero» delle regioni: il consolidamento degli indirizzi 
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economic and cultural development of the Regions, require the previous communication 
to the national state, which may provide guidelines the Regions have to take into 
account. If the central government fails to communicate any observation within 30 days, 
the Region can act108. It is still unclear whether the CBC agreements concluded within 
the context of the EOC are dealt with by the above mentioned procedure or rather by 
the stricter rules set in the national law enforcing the Madrid Convention. The above-
described extremely detailed procedure reveals the central government‘s fear 
concerning the regional external conduct.  
3.3 Ethnic Minorities 
 
The possible link between CBC and the protection of ethnic minorities has emerged 
quite recently in the legal and scholarly debate. Clear evidence of that is Art. 18 of the 
Council of Europe‘s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCPNM).109 
 
At first, the connection between ethnic minorities protection and CBC can appear 
obvious. In fact, since the core of CBC is the very fact that populations and subnational 
units of two bordering national states cooperate jointly, ―trans-border cooperation is per 
se a way to deal with ethnic diversity‖.110  
 
However, ethnic diversity can actually be a problem for CBC. This may occur, as it has 
been convincingly pointed out, ―when the cross-border activities affect a territory where 
the (majority of the) population is ethnically homogeneous with the (majority of the) 
population on the other side of the border and thus generally a minority in the state to 
which it belongs‖.111 In such a situation, national governments can consider CBC as a 
potential threat to their national integrity. This fear can get even more accentuated 
when national minorities are concentrated in territorial areas enjoying special self-
government rights.  
 
This is the case of the Land Tyrol and of the two autonomous Italian Provinces of 
Trento and Bolzano.112 In the latter is concentrated a German-speaking minority that is 
                                                                                                                                            
giurisprudenziali e dottrinali nel D.P.R. 31 marzo 1994‘, (1995) Rivista italiana diritto pubblico comunitario, 
981 
108 On the current regulatory framework see: Maria Romana Allegri, ‗Dalla cooperazione transfrontaliera 
alla cooperazione territoriale: problemi di ordine costituzionale‘, in Antonio Papisca (ed.), Il gruppo europeo 
di cooperazione territoriale (Marsilio, 2009), 63-93; Adele Anzon Demming, I poteri delle Regioni, 
(Giappichelli, 2008), 171-185; Antonio Ruggeri, ―Riforma del Titolo V e «potere estero delle Regioni 
(notazioni di ordine metodico-ricostruttivo)‖, (2002) at <www.giurcost.org/studi>. 
109 According to which ―the contracting parties shall endeavor to conclude, where necessary, bilateral and 
multilateral agreements with other states, in particular neighboring states, in order to ensure the 
protection of persons belonging to the national minorities concerned. Where relevant, the parties shall 
take measures to encourage transfrontier cooperation‖. 
110 See Francesco Palermo, ‗Trans-border cooperation and ethnic diversity‘, in Jørgen Kühl, Marc Weller, 
Minority Policy in Action: The Bonn-Copenaghen Declaration in a European Context 1955-2000 (European 
Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, and Institut for Graenseregionsforksning, Aabenraa, 2005), 161-
185, at 161. 
111 Ibid., at 162 
112 Ibid., at 166. 
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actually the majority in the territory concerned. Following an international interstate 
agreement on CBC signed between Austria and Italy in January 1993, the three 
territorial units established a roundtable of experts in order to explore legal ways to 
allow a strong institutionalized form of CBC. The draft proposal envisaged a common 
permanent organization, to be called Euroregion Tyrol, which was empowered to make 
decisions with binding force. Both national governments reacted firmly to this political 
initiative. The Austrian government, in an internal expert opinion, noted it had not 
been informed about the beginning of negotiations, as Article 16 of the Austrian 
constitution requires, and it further objected that no public law entities were admissible 
under both Austrian and Italian law.113 A similar attitude was taken by the Italian 
government, whose Ministry of Interior defined the project as subversive. For a long 
time, the idea of a strong institutionalization of CBC in the Brenner area was put aside, 
although the recent approval of the EGTC Regulation reopened the political debate. 
 
In some cases, the very fact that ethnic tensions are present in a given area is the main 
reason to develop CBC. However, CBC is driven by the national governments, and it 
becomes part of a larger strategy for pacification. This scheme has been followed in the 
Northern Ireland context.  
 
Both Ireland and the United Kingdom do not provide any legal ground for transfrontier 
or interregional cooperation. Neither of them signed the Madrid Outline Convention, 
and limited interregional cooperation practices took place only in the context of the 
INTERREG programme (such as Transmanche and Rives-Manche between Kent and 
the French Region Nord-Pas-de-Calais114). 
 
According to the Good Friday Agreement between Ireland and the United Kingdom in 
1998, a North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC) was established, a body that brings 
together ministers of the Northern Ireland government and the government of the 
Republic of Ireland. The agreement also provides for several joint bodies, with a clear 
operational remit, to operate in the field of transport, agriculture, education, health care, 
the environment and tourism. All bodies are responsible to the NSMC, whose policies 
they must implement.115 
 
The ethnic issue can also be problematic for the development of CBC in the case of 
multinational states. In a multinational state, there are no, properly speaking, ‗national 
minorities‘ since it is the state itself that is made of several distinct national groups, 
representing the constitutive units of the state.116 This is reflected in the institutional 
                                               
113 See the official comments of the Federal Chancellor‘s Office and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
documents in Pernthaler and Ortino, La bozza di statuto, op. cit. note 25, at 278-289.  
114 See Andrew Church, Peter Reid, ‗Cross-border Co-operation, Institutionalization and Political Space 
Across the English Channel‘, (1999) Regional Studies 33 (7), 643-655. 
115 For further details about and criticisms of the proper functioning of this institutional framework, see 
Palermo, in Kühl, Weller, Minority Policy Action, op. cit. note  at 165, see also Francesco Gilioli, ‗Cross-
border cooperation in Ireland, its legal framework and Europe: a third party view‘, 3 Queen‘s papers on 
Europeanisation (2005), at 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/Research/PaperSerie
s/EuropeanisationPapers/PublishedPapers/, 13. 
116 See Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk, Diritto costituzionale comparato dei gruppi e delle minoranze 
(Cedam, 2008), at 53. 
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framework which not only grants a high degree of autonomy to those territories where 
the various national groups are mainly settled, but which also adopts a governmental 
framework in which the power is shared among the different national groups.117 
Whereas in some cases, as in Switzerland, the multinational state is effectively cohesive, 
in others it is not, and the institutional equilibrium is more precarious. In this event, the 
territorial units often claim, or even act as if, they are quasi-autonomous states.  
 
In this institutional pattern, the power to conduct external or foreign relations is seen 
as instrumental to claiming their political distinctiveness in respect to the state as a 
whole118. The already mentioned case of Belgium is eloquent to this regard but it could 
be applied to a certain extent to Spain as well.  
 
In more recent years, there has been a resurgence of nationalistic parties in Catalonia, 
the Basque Country and Galicia claiming for more powers as a sign of their 
distinctiveness in respect to the other CCAA.119 In 2004, the Basque parliament 
approved a proposal for a new Estatuto de autonomia120 (so called Plan Ibarretxe) 
according to which sovereignty would have been vested to the component nations, with 
Spain being reduced to a mere confederation. The plan was, however, rejected by the 
national parliament.121 
 
The reforming procedure of the Estatuto de Autonomia took place in Catalonia as well, 
and it was approved by the national Parliament.122 However the Partido Popular – the 
political party at the opposition in the national Parliament at the moment of enacting 
the Estatuto – took action before the constitutional tribunal, claiming the 
unconstitutionality of numerous provisions. In June 2010, the constitutional tribunal 
estimated illegitimate some articles of it.123  
 
                                               
117 See Marc Weller, Stefan Wolff (eds.), Autonomy, Self-Governance and Conflict Resolution: Innovative 
Approaches to Institutional Design in Divided Societies (Routledge, 2005). 
118 See Thomas Wilson, ‗Sovereignty, Identity and Borders. Political Anthropology and European 
Integration‘, in Liam O‘Dowd, Thomas Wilson (ed.), Borders, Nations and States, (Aldershot, 1996), 199-
221; Marc Abeles, Werner Rossade (ed.s), Politiques symboliques en Europe, (Duncker and Humblot, 1993). 
119 See Eliseo Aja, El Estado autonómico. Federalismo y hechos diferenciales, (Alianza editorial, 2003); Roberto 
L. Blanco Valdes, Nacionalidades históricas y regiones sin historia, (Alianza editoral, 2005). 
120 The act containing the basic institutional norms, including the powers a CA is granted, is called 
estatuto de autonomia. The Assembly of the CCAA are called to propose a text of the Estatuto which, in 
order to become legal effective, must be approved by the National Parliament with a ley organica—a 
national statute whose legal rank is higher than ordinary statutes (Art. 147.3). 
121 In relation to the Plan Ibarretxe, see José Manuel Castells Arreche (ed.), Estudios sobre la propuesta 
politica para la convivencia del lehendakari Ibarretxe (IVAP, Oñate, 2003); Tomás Ramón Fernández 
Rodríguez, ‗Sobre la viabilidad de la impugnación jurisdiccional de Plan Ibarretxe‘, (14) Teoria y realidad 
constitucional (2004), 117-132. 
122 The literature concerning the reform of the Catalonian Estatuto and of the others CC.AA. Estatutos de 
Autonomia is extensive: see Enoch Albertí Rovira, ‗El blindaje de las competencias y la reforma 
estatutaria‘, (2005) Revista catalana de dret public (31), 109-136; G. Rico-Rico Ruiz (ed.), La reforma de los 
Estatutos de Autonomia, Actas del IV Congreso Nacional de la Asociación de Constitutiocalistas de España (Tirant 
lo Blanch, 2006). 
123 See decision n. 31/2010, 28 june 2010. 
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Although the Catalonia Estatuto does not contain references to independence as the 
Basque plan did, it nonetheless puts a strong emphasis on the ‗distinctiveness‘ of 
Catalonia in the context of Spain.  
In this regard, one of the key issues is exactly the power to act externally124. An entire 
chapter (Chapter 3) of the Estatuto is dedicated to the issue, with eight provisions 
specifically dealing with it. Although reaffirming the exclusive power of the national 
state to conduct foreign relations (in line with Art. 149.1.3 of the Spanish constitution), 
the Estatuto seems to formalize the previous case law of the constitutional tribunal in the 
field, in some cases going a little further.  
 
Article 195 of the Estatuto establishes that Catalonia can conclude agreements within its 
powers for the promotion of the Catalonia general interests, somehow implicitly 
considering the power to act externally as a way to exercise internal powers. The 
provision does not say anything about the subjects—states or component units of a 
state—with whom to cooperate with. 125 Besides, it calls for the national state to provide 
support to the Catalonian power to act externally. 
 
The following Article 196 of the Estatuto claims for an involvement of Catalonia 
whenever an international treaty, to be signed by the national state, impinges upon 
Catalonia‘s reserved matters. Moreover, the following Article 197 explicitly mentions 
transfrontier and interregional cooperation as a way for Catalonia to pursue its external 
power.  
 
It is difficult to say at the moment what the practical consequences that the enactment 
of this Estatuto will have on the Spanish national policy towards the external conduct of 
the CCAA. However, since these provisions have been substantially agreed upon by the 
national government, they probably have to be seen as a part of the new institutional 
equilibrium among national groups composing Spain. It is then likely this will lead to a 
more supportive attitude of the national state towards CBC of CCAA. 
3.4 Supranational conditionality and CBC in countries in Transition: 
the Case of Central Eastern Europe  
 
The title of this section may give rise to some criticisms. It considers under the category 
of ―countries in transition‖ states that have experienced independence and democratic 
regimes for more than 20 years and that are now part of the EU, thus sharing the 
democratic values this institution underpins.  
                                               
124 On the regional external power as a symbolic way to highlights territorial identity of the Spanish 
CC.AA: see Stéphane Pacquin, ‗La paradiplomatie identitaire et les relations Barcelone-Madrid‘, (2002) 
Études internationals 1 (33), 57-90; Margarita Ledo Andion, Josep Maria Sole I Sabate, ‗Le droit à 
l‘autodétermination. Un exemple des limites démocratiques de l‘État espagnol à l‘égard des nationalités‘, 
in Marc Abeles, Werner Rossade, op. cit. note  117, 377-381. 
125 Precisely for that reason, art. 195 was among the provisions whose constitutionality has been 
challenged before the constitutional tribunal. The Court rejected the claim stating that the provision is to 
be considered legitimate, provided that it is applied within the limits established by the constitutional 
tribunal itself in its previous case-law. This means that no agreements with subject of the international 
legal order are allowed. 
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Moreover, it does not take into account that each of these countries presents a different 
legal regime concerning CBC. To this regard, we may note that there are national 
experiences, such as Poland and Hungary, that enshrined in their constitutions the 
power of subnational units to conclude cross-border agreements with foreign 
counterparts and the power to join associations of frontier European regions. In other 
cases, it is a statute (generally the law on municipality or, where relevant, on regions) 
that explicitly grants such a power.126  
 
There are also important differences concerning the procedure and the material scope of 
the central government‘s supervision power.  
 
In the Czech Republic, the agreements concluded by municipalities with their foreign 
counterparts are not subject to specific forms of control, whereas regional agreements 
or those instituting cross-border bodies require the previous consent of the Ministry of 
Interior.  
 
In Poland, the regional level (voivodat), which enjoys administrative powers in the field 
of economic and social programming, is granted remarkable external power. However, 
before concluding a cooperative agreement with a foreign regional counterpart, it must 
obtain the consent of the Foreign Affairs Minister.127  
 
In Romania, according to law 215/2001 on local public administration, before 
concluding any transfrontier agreement, the local government shall obtain advice from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and inform the Ministry of the Public Administration.128 
 
In Slovakia, the development of cross-border bodies, taking the form of Euroregion 
based on private law, was problematic until the ratification of the EOC129.  
                                               
126 See the Czech Republic law on the regions 131/2000 and the law on municipalities (number 
128/2000); Slovak Republic law 302/2001 on local self-government in the autonomous regions and law 
30272001 on municipalities as emended following ratification in 2000 of the Madrid Outline convention; 
Romania law 215/2001 on local public administration; and Bulgaria 1991 law on local autonomy. These 
data are based on the information collected by the Council of Europe in its report on the current state of 
cross-border cooperation, op. cit. note 82 at 93. 
127 Maja Kozlowska, ‗Aspetti costituzionali ed amministrativi del decentramento dello stato unitario 
polacco‘, in Istituto di studi sui Sistemi Regionali, federali e sulle Autonomie (ISSIRFA), at 
<http://www.issirfa.cnr.it/4759,949.html>. 
128 The case of Romania and Slovakia presents some inconsistencies. Although in both countries ordinary 
statutes appear to grant local and, in the case of Slovakia, regional units the general power to conclude 
CBC agreements, the Act of Ratification of the Madrid Outline Convention suggests a different 
conclusion. Both countries made a declaration according to which the enforcement of the Outline 
Convention is subject to the previous conclusion of an international agreement with the party concerned. 
Whereas in the case of Slovakia this is not any more of a limitation—since it has concluded international 
treaties with all border states—in the case of Romania, none of these international agreements have been 
concluded. 
129 For a very detailed analysis of the Slovak legal framework concerning CBC and of the main 
experiences concerning Euroregions set in Slovakia, see Ol‘ga Marhulíková, ‗Institutional Aspects of 
Transfrontier Co-operation in the Slovak Republic‘, study conducted and published by Council of Europe, 
in The role of Euroregions in transfrontier co-operation. Three cases studies: the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, 
South-Eastern Europe (2006), at 
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Thus, the national CBC legal framework certainly varies from country to country, 
although there are some similarities. These are, for instance, the preference for the 
setting up of private law–based cross-border bodies (often lacking any legal capacity) 
and the application of specific forms of national state supervision whenever the external 
conduct of the territorial community is likely to have more political relevance, as is the 
case for the setting up of a cross-border body or for agreements concluded by the 
regional territorial level (see Czech Republic, Poland). 
 
However, despite these national disparities, it is undoubted that there exists a common 
background concerning CBC. All CEE countries have been equally and deeply affected 
by both European and international trends. The relevance of external factors in 
favouring the CEE countries‘ transition towards the Western legal tradition has been 
stressed by several scholars who have pointed out how the accession to first the CoE 
and then the European Union have favoured, if not required, the previous acceptance of 
democratic values.130 CBC was considered as part of this process, and that is why I deem 
it appropriate to stress in the title of this section the link between CBC and the 
democratic transition that has occurred in the CEE countries. 
 
All CEE countries ratified the EOC, thus accepting the idea that CBC is a legitimate 
practice. To a certain extent, this may seem surprising. In newly freed or independent 
states, as the CEE countries were, the priority was building a nation and preserving the 
national sovereignty that had been only recently been regained. In this framework CBC 
could be considered as a threat to their integrity. The picture was still further 
complicated by the interplay of other factors. Several state borders (Germany–Czech, 
Germany–Poland, Slovak–Hungary, Hungary–Romania) were and still are very 
sensitive from an ethnic point of view because of the ethnic cleansing that occurred 
during and immediately after World War II. Moreover, CEE countries had no previous 
history of truly democratic regional or local decentralization.131 
 
Certainly, in some cases, these factors play a significant role in hindering the CBC, but 
in general terms it can be noted that the CEE countries took quite quickly a positive 
attitude towards CBC.  
 
A primary important reason to explain this is certainly the commitment of the CEE 
states towards the protection of national minorities. This link between minority rights 
and CBC has been stressed in almost all bilateral treaties for the protection of national 
                                                                                                                                            
<https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?Index=no&command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Ins
tranetImage=1531231&SecMode=1&DocId=1343260&Usage=2>. 
130 See Dimitry Kochenov, ‗Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of the 
Copenhagen Political Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of Law‘, (2004) 8(10) EIOP, at 
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-010a.htm>. 
131 All these factors are highlighted by Emil J. Kirchner, ‗Transnational Border Cooperation between 
Germany and The Czech Republic: Implications for Decentralization and European Integration‘, 
European University Institute, RSC Working Paper No 98/50, December 1998, at 
<http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/98_50t.html>. 
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minorities or on good neighbourly and friendly cooperation concluded by practically all 
CEE countries.132 
 
The second important factor has been the efforts for developing democratic and 
autonomous local territorial communities.133 The CoE institutions have played a pivotal 
role, especially in sustaining the strong connection between the right to self-
government of territorial communities and their entitlement to act ‗externally‘. To this 
regard it should be noted that the EOC has not been the only CoE international 
document relevant for the topic. A larger impact on the CEE countries local 
democratisation has been determined by the European Charter of Local Self-
Government, whose Articles 10.2 and 10.3 explicitly entitle local authorities, 
respectively, to belong to an international association of local authorities and the power 
to cooperate with their foreign counterparts under such conditions as may be provided 
for by law.134 
 
The third important common driver, which may be the more influential one, has been 
the European Union and its PHARE Programme, which since 1994, has boosted in 
many cases the creation of Euroregions along the former EU border.135 
 
The CEE countries faced and still are facing common internal challenges. One of them 
is certainly the decentralization issue, which is important for our topic since successful 
CBC requires effective local self-government. The local institutions in the CEE 
countries seem weak, especially considering that the local government finance is still 
dependent on central funding.136 Moreover, the decentralization is of the administrative 
                                               
132 See Aree Bloed and Pieter van Dijk (eds.), Protection of Minority Rights Through Bilateral Treaties—The 
case of Central and Eastern Europe (Kluwer Law International, 1999). See also the special focus on CBC and 
minorities in Eastern Europe in 6 European Yearbooks of Minority Issues (2006/7), 137 et seq., with the 
contributions of Katrin Böttger, ‗Transnational and Trans-regional Cooperation and Effects on the 
Situation of Minorities: A Case Study of the Polish–Ukrainian Border Region‘; Nataliya Belitser, ‗A Case 
Study on Crossborder Cooperation in the Ukrainian–Moldovan Border Region and Its Effects on the 
Respective Minorities‘; Martin Klatt and Jørgen Kühl, ‗National Minorities and Crossborder Cooperation 
between Hungary and Croatia. A Case Study of Baranya, Hungary and Osiječ ko-baranjska County, 
Croatia‘; Karina Zabielska, ‗Crossborder Cooperation in Mid-Eastern Europe and Its Influence on 
Minorities: the Case of the Lithuanian Minority in Poland‘; and Alice Engl and Jens Woelk, ‗Crossborder 
Cooperation and Minorities in Eastern Europe: Still Waiting for a Chance? A Summary and Evaluation of 
the Four Case Studies‘. 
133 See Andrew Coulson, Adrian Campbell (eds.), Local Government in Central and Eastern Europe: The 
Rebirth of Local Democracy (Routledge, 2006); Harald Baldersheim (ed.), Local Democracy and the Processes of 
Transformation in East-Central Europe (Westview Press, 1996). 
134 The European Charter of Local Self-Government was signed in Strasbourg on 15 October 1985. It 
entered into force 1 November 1988. Text available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/122.htm>. 
135 See Grzegorz Gorzelak, ‗Normalizing Polish-German Relations: Cross-border cooperation in Regional 
Development‘, 195-205, and Hans-Joachim Bürkner, ‗Regional Development in Times of Economic Crisis 
and Population Loss: the Case of Germany‘s Eastern Border Regionalism‘, 207-215, both contributions in 
James Wesley Scott, EU Enlargement, Region Building and Shifting Borders of Inclusion and Exclusion 
(Ashgate, 2006); Zoltán Pogátsa, ‗Regionalisation, the Powers of Subnational Entities in Hungary and the 
Central European Region‘,  (2002) Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo (2), 782-793. 
136 For a general overview of the legislation on local government in some CEE member states, see 
Michaela Salamun, ‗The Laws on the Organization of the Administration in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia: a Comparative Analysis in the Context of European Integration‘, (2007) 
Review of Central and East European Law (32), 267-301. 
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type. CEE countries have been reluctant to establish a powerful middle territorial level, 
either because of the countries‘ sizes or for fear that the creation of a regional power 
might compete with the central one. Where this institutional move has occurred 
(Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and, more recently, Slovenia), it was mainly in 
response to the requests of the European Commission for a more effective 
implementation of the EU structural funds. 
 
The weak role of the intermediate level, which, even in those cases in which it has been 
settled, enjoys only administrative powers, can represent a serious obstacle in the 
development of a more strategic cross-border policy, according to the meaning I have 
outlined earlier in this chapter. The fact that the richest counterparts in the area are 
represented by ‗strong‘ regions empowered with legislative competences (German and 
Austrian Länder) does not help too much. The risk is in fact that the CBC, or at least 
the more strategic cross-border projects, will be driven almost entirely by the central 
government, according to a top-down approach not sufficiently balanced by effective 
subnational-level participation. 
 
4. An attempt of classification of the national practices by looking at 
empirical cases of CBC 
 
Taking into account the different factors influencing the national policies towards CBC 
outlined above, the purpose of this paragraph will be to suggest a classification of the 
national policies towards CBC within three groups. References to some CBC national 
empirical cases, considered as paradigmatic, will back up our attempt at classification. 
4.1 “Soft promotional” national states   
 
The first model can be labeled as a ―soft promotional‖ national state. This is especially 
the case for Germany and Switzerland. It should be noted that CBC in both countries 
have been developed mainly according to a bottom-up approach which has especially 
interested the local tier of territorial government, though the latter acts in form of 
inter-municipal association.137 To this extent, the upper territorial levels – the national 
state but even the Länder (which enjoy power on matters related to local self-
government) – have played a role in accompanying this development by enforcing 
instruments when proved useful. To this regard, the already mentioned Isselburg-
Anholt, Mainz, Karlsruhe international treaties are good evidence of that. 
 
The regional level has increasingly showed an interest in developing CBC as the 
Karlsruhe agreement reveals, with Länder being specifically empowered to make use of 
the legal instruments provided by it. The inherent cooperative nature of the 
intergovernmental relations can probably explain why in the area CBC, though mainly 
developed according to a bottom approach, has nonetheless beneficiated of the national 
state attention.  
                                               
137 See Markus Perkmann, ‗Cross-border regions in Europe‘, op. cit. in note 1. 
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To this extent, the analysis of CBC practices in the upper Rhine area may support this 
view.138 From a legal point of view, the CBC in the Upper-Rhine area is grounded on an 
international agreement signed in Bonn in 1975 among the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France and Switzerland. The agreement set an intergovernmental 
Commission with representatives of the three states charged with the promotion of 
transfrontier cooperation between the territories concerned. The Bonn agreement 
represented the legal ground for the establishment of the Upper Rhine Euroregion - the 
larger territorial CBC body within which CBC practices have developed in the area – 
made up of the Haut et Bas Rhin French departments, the Swiss Cantons of Bale Ville 
and Bale Campagne, the German Länder of Baden Wuttemberg and Rhineland-
Palatinate. Although the CBC cooperation in the area started originally according to an 
up-down approach, later on a bottom up approach prevailed. In fact, the Bonn Treaty 
provided for an Upper Rhine conference made up of local territorial actors 
representatives, plus the involvement of the regional prefect for the French part. It was 
this institution that was (and still is) the real engine of the cooperation practices in the 
area.  
 
A new agreement concluded in Basel in 2000 replaced the Bonn agreement. It 
recognized the important role the Upper Rhine conference had for the CBC. It is then 
up to this institution, which has a policy coordinating role, to smooth the cooperation 
and only in the case a solution cannot be found, it would refer to the intergovernmental 
commission.  
 
Another reason of interest for the Upper-Rhine region is given by the fact that a sort of 
Russian doll structure has been put in place to institutionalize CBC, varying in scale 
depending on the level considered most appropriated to deal with each specific issue, 
thus applying a subsidiarity principle form to CBC. 
 
Within the perimeter of the Euroregion of the Upper-Rhine conference, other three 
Euroregions have been established. They are Pamina, Centre-Harnolte and the 
TriRhena Region. Among the components of TriRhena, there is the Regio Basiliensis. 
This is an institutional actors and civil society association in the area of Bale which at 
the same time has been charged with the secretariat of the Swiss government delegation 
in the intergovernmental commission established by the Bonn treaty. Thus, the double 
role performed by the Region Basiliensis – both as a local player and as a permanent 
connector with the national state – has permitted this institution to play a decisive 
role.139 
                                               
138 See, for further details, James Wesley Scott, ‗Transborder Cooperation, Regional Initiatives, and 
Sovereignty Conflicts in Western Europe. The Case of the Upper Rhine Valley‘, (1989) Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism 19 (1), 139-156; Walter Ferrara, ―La Regio Basiliensis e la cooperazione 
transfrontaliera nella regione del Reno superiore‖, in Walter Ferrara, Paolo Pasi, Come funzionano le 
euroregioni. Esplorazione in sette casi (Isig, 2000), 27-39 ; Jochen Sohnle, Françoise Schneider, ―La 
coopération transfrontalière dans l‘espace du Rhin supérieur et le cas particulier de l‘agglomération 
trinationale de Bale‖, in Comte and Levrat, Aux coutures de l’Europe, op. cit. note 11, 35-59. 
139 See Alberto Gasparini, D. Del Bianco, EUREGO Progetto di una Euroregione transfrontaliera, (Isig, 
Gorizia, 2005), at 38 seq. 
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4.2 “Strongly promotional” national states 
 
The second national attitude can be defined as ―strongly promotional‖. France is 
particularly indicative of this approach.140 By means of its decentralized territorial organ 
(the Prefect), the national state has often taken part in CBC projects, especially when 
they have a strategic territorial relevance, going beyond the local dimension.  
 
The prefect (usually at the regional level) has the task not only of ensuring the 
legitimacy of the CBC agreements but also of coordinating CBC and distributing 
national resources. This role has been defined by a governmental document (circulaire) 
significantly named ―Coopération décentralisée et role des services déconcentrés de l’Etat‖. 
After reminding the will of the national state to encourage CBC, the document states 
that it is up to the regional prefect to define a yearly program for CBC, in strict 
cooperation with territorial units, which have to nonetheless respect the geographical 
and thematic priorities established by the Foreign Affairs  Minister.141 
 
Another feature to be highlighted is that many national administrative structures have 
been created in order to provide legal support and national coordination of French CBC 
subnational units.142 
 
The involvement of the national state has almost transformed CBC from a practice 
functional to the development of self-government rights of local units to a sort of 
promotion of  national interest, though applied locally. Another explanation for this 
move seems to rely on the fact that the bordering foreign counterparts of the French 
collectivités are usually strong subnational units enjoying economic resources and 
legislative powers. The role of the prefect may be that of supporting the project, both 
politically and legally, whenever the powers of the French regions are not enough when 
compared with their foreign counterparts.143 
                                               
140 See the rapport edited by the Conseil d‘Etat, Le Cadre juridique de l’action extérieure des collectivités 
locales, (La documentation française, Paris, 2006), at 32 : «L‘Etat conçoit son rôle comme celui 
d‘intermédiaire encourageant et facilitant la mise en ouvre d‘actions des coopération décentralisée […] Il 
lui appartient également de veiller à la mise en cohérence et à l‘efficacité de l‘aide apportée en fonction des 
besoins locaux». 
141 Circulaire du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 26 February 2003, Coopération décentralisée et rôle 
des services déconcentrés de l‘Etat : cofinancements du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, «Dans le cadre 
des enveloppes budgétaire annuelles qui sont notifiés aux préfets de région, et sur la base des dossiers 
établis par les collectivités territoriales, le Préfet de région proposera, après avis éventuels des préfets de 
départements et en concertation avec les autorités territoriales, un programme régional annuel de 
coopération décentralisée. Cette programmation devra veiller au maintien de l‘équilibre entre les 
différents niveaux de collectivités territoriales (communes, départements, et régions) et leurs 
groupements dans le respect des priorités géographiques et thématiques communiquées par le ministère 
des Affaires étrangères ». 
142 See, for example, the Delegué pour l’action extérieure des collectivités locales, which is nominated by the 
Foreign Affair minister and which is called to support technically the regional prefects. In 1992 it was 
established the Commission nationale de la coopération décentralisé, made up of national and local 
representatives; more recently it has been set the Mission Operationnelle Transfrontalière. For further 
details see the already mentioned rapport of the Conseil d‘Etat, op. cit. at 36. 
143 See Alain Lamassoure, Les relations transfrontalières des collectivités locales françaises, rapport presented to 
the Foreign Affairs minister, (May 2005), available at <www.espaces-
transfrontaliers.org/document/rapport_lamassoure.pdf>, p. 23: «La création d‘une unité d‘action [sur un 
territoire transfrontalier donné] nécessite aussi de repenser la place de l‘Etat dans l‘organisation politique 
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It is in the light of this scenario that we can consider some examples of CBC 
institutionalisation. 
 
The first case we would like to consider is the CBC practices occurring along the 
French and Swiss borders surrounding Geneva.144 From an historical point of view, it is 
important to recall that several CBC initiatives in the area – although favored by 
previous and lasting relations in the past – started with an international agreement 
signed between France and Switzerland, the latter acting on behalf of the Geneva 
Canton. With this agreement the Geneva Canton took the commitment to pay directly 
to the French bordering subnational units a part of the revenues paid by the French 
transfrontalier workers. 
 
This top-down initiative led nonetheless to the setting of the Comité Regional franco-
genevois, composed of representatives of the Swiss Cantons (Geneva and Vaud) and of 
French subnational units which effectively  became the real CBC political engine in the 
area. It is important to note, however, that the prefect of the French Region Rhone-Alp 
is a constitutive party of the Comité, highlighting the role of the French state as an 
active CBC player. 
 
The activist role in supporting CBC emerges more recently considering that France is a 
constitutive party of some of the first EGTCs set thus far in Europe.  
 
To this extent, we may consider the case of the Eurométropole Lille–Kortrijk-Tournai. 
 
Unlike the above mentioned CBC case in the area of Geneva, here CBC started 
according to a bottom-up approach. It was thanks to an initiative of the urban 
community of Lille and of two associations of Belgian local units that in 1991 the 
Conférence Permanente intercommunale transfrontalière (Copit) was set as a non formalized 
body for CBC. The initiative was meant to establish new development opportunities for 
the area which was experiencing an economic decline.145 
 
The CBC took a new emphasis at the end of ‘90, thanks to a project co-financed by 
INTERREG EU program. At the end of this experience, the political will for a more 
formalized form of cooperation which put together the major territorial actors, 
including the national states, emerged in order to develop a transborder governance for 
the economic and territorial development of the area. The Bruxelles international 
agreement was meant to provide the legal instruments to formalize this cooperation. 
                                                                                                                                            
et, si besoin est, juridique de ces projets. La présence de l‘Etat dans les structures de Gouvernance doit 
être organisée de telle sorte que son représentant soit en mesure de prendre des engagements, ou, à 
défaut, de transmettre les demandes aux autorités centrales en étant entendu. Dans le même temps, 
l‘éventail des outils juridique doit être adapté pour permettre à l‘Etat, là ou cela est souhaité, de participer 
aux structure juridiques qui se mettront en place».  
144 See Nicolas Wismer, Christine Ricci, ‗L‘agglomération franco-valdo-genevoise‘, in H. Comte, N. Levrat 
(ed.s), Aux coutures …, op. cit. note 11, 139-176. 
145 See, for further details, Valérie Biot, Pierre Got, ‗Une strategie pour faire de l‘aire métropolitaine 
franco-belge une métropole transfrontalière: le projet Grootstad‘, in H. Comte, N. Levrat (ed.s), Aux 
coutures …, op. cit. note 11, 61-84. 
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However, the adoption of the EGTC Regulation pushed the institutional actors to 
pursue this route further on. 
 
The Eurométropole Lille–Kortrijk-Tournai EGTC, constituted in January 2008, is 
made up of the two national state representatives, representatives at the regional level 
(Flemish Region, Walloon region and French speaking community and the Région 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais), representatives of the meso-territorial level (French Département 
du Nord and Provinces of Western Flanders and of Nainaut) and of local territorial 
units associations. The objectives of the EGTC are vaguely defined, confirming the 
nature of the EGTC as a policy coordination forum.146 
4.3 “Reluctant” national states 
 
Finally a third model is represented by Italy which displays a ―reluctant‖ attitude 
toward CBC. The reasons for this approach relied on the fact that CBC is mostly seen as 
a regional rather than a local issue. Often, the regional players used CBC as a way to 
promote their political distinctiveness rather than to pursue clear-cut objectives. the 
presence of ethnic minorities along the national borders which are the majority of the 
population in the relevant regions further complicates the issue. 
 
The case concerning the Euroregione Alpi Mediterraneo setting is quite indicative of 
this approach.  
 
In the attempt to urge the national authorities to transpose the EGTC European 
Regulation into the national legal order, in February 2009, the Region Liguria approved 
a statute stating that it shall participate in the so-called Euroregione Alpi-Mediterraneo, 
an EGTC the Liguria will constitute with other Italian and French regions. The 
regional statute, which enclosed the institutive acts of the above-mentioned EGTC, was 
sent to the national authorities two weeks before its enactment. Moreover, a provision 
specifies that the Liguria participation in the EGTC would be fully effective provided 
the consent of the Italian national state was given, in pursuance of the EC Regulation 
1082/2006. 
 
The reaction of the national state was sharp. The government itself took action before 
the constitutional court, claiming that by enacting the challenged statute before the 
national enforcement of Regulation 1082/2006, Liguria breached the constitutional 
principle of loyal collaboration. The national state went even further. It argued that the 
regional statute was also in breach of the EC Regulation—and, indirectly, of the Italian 
constitution. In fact, according to the government complaint, the EC Regulation limits 
                                               
146 According to art. 2 of the Constitutive convention of the Eurometropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai 
EGTC : ―L‘Eurométropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai a pour mission principale de promouvoir et de soutenir 
une coopération transfrontalière efficace et cohérente au sein du territoire concerné. En rassemblant 
l‘ensemble des institutions compétentes, l‘Eurométropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai est un lieu permettant : 
d‘assurer la concertation, le dialogue et de favoriser le débat politique ; de produire de la cohérence 
transfrontalière à l‘échelle de l‘ensemble du territoire ; de faciliter, de porter et de réaliser des projets 
traduisant la stratégie de développement à élaborer en commun, de faciliter la vie quotidienne des 
habitants de la métropole franco-belge‖. 
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the range of the activities an EGTC can carry out with regard to the strengthening of 
the economic and social cohesion of the parties involved. However, the Euroregione 
Alpi-Mediterraneo extended this material scope to political and cultural ties of the 
parties.147 Following the reaction of the national authorities, Regione Liguria passed a 
new statute (n. 2, 15 February 2010), repealing the original reference to the 
strengthening of ―political ties‖, as one of the aims pursued by the Euroregione Alpi-
Mediterraneo. The regional intervention smoothed the procedure for authorising the 
establishment of the mentioned EGTC. In March 2010, the Italian constitutional court 
(decision 112/2010) rejected the claim by the national authorities noting that the 
challenged statute of Regione Liguria was meant to be fully effective only after the 
enactment of national law enforcing EGTC Regulation. Furthermore, the constitutional 
court observed that the repealing of the words ―political ties‖ was enough to conclude 
that the statutory aims of the Euroregione were in line with the EC Regulation. 
 
A more favourable approach arose when the CBC project presented a more focus 
tailored objective, as has been the case for the Brenner Corridor Platform. This is a 
cooperative agreement among the representatives of the three national states (Germany, 
Austria and Italy), of the regions involved (Bavaria, the Land Tirolo, the autonomous 
provinces of Trento and Bolzano and the Verona province) and the railway companies148 
whose setting is mainly due to the initiative of the European Coordinator.149  The main 
goal of the Platform is the construction of a tunnel in the Brenner area, linking the 
territory of Austria and Italy, as part of the European Priority project 1150, concerning 
the construction of a rail connecting Berlin and Palermo.151  
 
The case of the Brenner Corridor Platform is interesting for at least two reasons. 
Despite that, initially, the focus of the project was on the construction of the tunnel—a 
matter that involved only national competences—a different approach subsequently 
emerged. The construction of such a rail infrastructure has deep consequences for the 
economic development and the territorial planning of the territories concerned. Since 
these matters are reserved for the regional territorial level, there was an interest in 
setting up a coordination policy arena linking together national and regional territorial 
levels as well. Moreover, such a regional involvement took place in national contexts 
(Italy and Austria), which have shown restrictive attitudes towards CBC, especially 
when conducted by the Brenner area regional actors. Most likely, the fact of being 
involved in the same project and the fact that the latter has a specific and clear focus, 
with no claims on political integration, has favoured a change of attitude in the national 
states. 
                                               
147 See complaint No. 30 of 5 May 2009 in GU, 3-6-2009. 
148 See Karel Van Miert, Annual Report 2007, priority project 1, p. 10. The full text of the report is 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/european_coordinators/2007_en.htm>. 
149 The European coordinator was set in pursuance of European decision 884/2004/CE, Art. 17-bis in 
O.J. L167, 30 April 2004. He has the task of easing the enforcement of those European transport projects 
that have a transfrontier dimension and thus require coordination between member states.  
150 See Debra Johnson, Colin Turner, The Political Economy of Integrating European Infrastructures 
(Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997); Jean Arnold Vinois, ‗Les réseaux transeuropéens: une nouvelle dimension 
donnée au Marché Unique‘, (1993) Revue du Marché Unique Européenne (1), 95-125. 
151 See Giulia Bertazzolo, ‗Il procedimento per l‘individuazione dei progetti prioritari nel settore dei 
trasporti (art. 154-156 del Trattato): caratteri e limiti della pianificazione comunitaria‘, (2008) Rivista 
italiana diritto pubblico comunitario, 792-834. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In the first part of this contribution, we have underlined some common legal 
developments that the two supranational driving forces in the field of CBC, namely the 
CoE acquis and the EU, are displaying.  
 
Firstly, we have highlighted the increasing attention towards legal instruments for 
institutionalising CBC. In the CoE context, this feature emerged at the time of the 
signature of the Additional Protocol to the EOC, although the model agreements listed 
to the text of the EOC reveal this was an issue already present at the time of the Madrid 
Convention. 
 
Currently, a move forward can be noted. The original model – somehow suggested by 
the Additional Protocol and further enforced by some of the interstate agreements (see 
for example the Valencia Treaty) – was in fact based on the remitting to the national 
law where the CBC body was located for the regulation of membership, powers, 
operations and so on. This is being replaced by a different framework where a ―common 
core‖ of harmonized rules for the establishment of a CBC body is provided, since the 
subnational units are unwilling to subject themselves to the national law of one of them.  
Earlier evidence of this new approach has been seen during the signing of the Karlsruhe 
agreement which regulates the Groupement locale de collectivités territoriale (GLCT).  The 
GLCT has been a legal model for following international treaties concerning CBC152 
and for the EU EGTC Regulation.  
 
The second emerging feature of the CBC European is the increasing relevance of 
institutionalised CBC as a means of developping policy coordination of different 
territorial players other than operative instruments aimed at solving specific cross-
border issues. The setting of a CBC body means to conceive CBC as a stable and lasting 
relation in order to permit the development of a true systematic cross-border policy 
concerning a larger territory and entailing the coordination of more territorial levels, 
according to the multilevel governance concept.153 This marks a departure from the idea 
of CBC as related only to neighbourly relations and having only a technical content, as 
was originally suggested by the EOC.  
 
This evolution could be hindered by some textual elements contained in the EU EGTC 
Regulation.154 However, the enforcement of the EGTC Regulation conducted thus far 
                                               
152 See especially the Bruxelles Agreement signed in 2002 and entered into force in 2004. It was 
concluded by France, Belgium, the Flemish Region, the Wallonia Region and the French-speaking 
community. French text available at the Moniteur Belge, 16 January 2004. 
153 See Nicolas Levrat, L’Europe et ses collectivités territoriales – Réflexions sur l’organisation du pouvoir 
territorial dans un monde globalisé (PIE-Peter Lang, 2005) 269-271. 
154 We are referring to the fact that the carrying out of tasks, other than those related to the 
implementation of the territorial cooperation programmes or projects within the structural funds, is 
construed in strict terms by art. 7. 3 of the EGTC Regulation. To this regard, it is also worth of 
mentioning the requirement, set by art. 7.2, according to which the EGTC could act only in common area 
of competences of the participating members. For further details see supra sect. 2.3 of the paper. This 
ambivalence also emerges by looking at the European Cooperation Grouping (ECG) legal framework as 
set in Protocol No. 3 to the EOC. On the one hand, art. 7 provides a great flexibility as regards the 
reasons why to conclude an ECG, thus admitting both operative and coordinating policies ECGs. 
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has showed that the potentiality of the EGTC to be used as a territorial multilevel 
forum has been generally accepted. Moreover, what according to the EGTC Regulation 
was conceived as an exception, (the carrying out of territorial cooperation tasks other 
than implementing EU financed territorial projects) is almost the rule. 
 
There is however a strong argument favouring the hypothesis that the EU Regulation 
drafters (and now the CoE Protocol No. 3) had perfectly in mind that the EGTC could 
be developed according to a multi-territorial governance framework: the provision 
concerning the possibility for a Member State to participate in an EGTC.  
 
In fact, CBC as a means of developing coordination policies determines consequences in 
relation both to the subjects and to the content of CBC. 
 
As far as the first element is concerned, CBC conceived as a mechanism of coordination 
policy tends to involve territorial units enjoying influential political capacity, such as 
federate states or regions or inter-municipal associations since the larger territorial 
units are in a best position to perform programming tasks. Again, the mentioned 
interstate international agreements are important evidences to this regard (see the 
Karlsruhe Agreement or the Brussels agreement, both providing special provisions 
dealing with the CBC enacted by the components units of federal states) and the 
empirical cases of CBC at the German, French, Swiss borders support this view. At the 
same time, it may demand for the direct or indirect involvement of the national tier of 
government among the actors of the CBC. This is due to the fact that the CBC as a 
policy may encroach upon matters pertaining to different territorial levels, included the 
national one.  
 
As far as the material content of CBC, since the main aim is on policy coordination, the 
attention is less on the matters of the cooperation and much more on the function of 
cooperating and coordinating. This can explain why the objectives of the EGTC thus 
far constituted are often expressed in vague terms, thus permitting to avoid strict 
control in the requirement of competences and their commonality among the EGTC 
participants. 
 
This emerging strategic dimension of the CBC should nonetheless be put into relation 
with the national attitudes towards CBC, as outlined in the second part of the 
contribution, so as to understand to what extent the latter can influence and reshape 
domestically the ―new‖ European CBC. 
 
Although the measurability of this influence is certainly difficult to assess, two factors 
will be taken into account. The first consists in looking how Member States have 
enforced art. 4.3 and 13 of the EGTC Regulation. These provisions deal respectively 
with the decision of the Member State not to approve the prospective member‘s 
                                                                                                                                            
Moreover, the explanatory report suggests that the very name of the ECG reflects the fact the ECG is 
meant ―to create sustainable networks and not new territorial entities‖, an idea that is strengthened by the 
possible participation of a national state in an ECG, provided that one or more of its territorial authorities 
or communities are members. On the other hand, this move towards multilevel governance is 
contradicted by the requirement (art. 1) that transfrontier or interregional cooperation, promoted by the 
ECG, must only concern common areas of competences of the participating members. 
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participation in case it considers such participation not justified for reasons of public 
interest or public policy (art. 4.3) and the possibility of a M. State authority to carry out 
specific control procedure in order to prohibit any activity of a EGTC in contravention 
of a Member State‘s provision on public policy, public security, public health or public 
morality, or in contravention of the public interest of a Member State (art. 13). 155 
 
Because of the inherent vagueness of the public interest/public policy notions, it is 
important to look at the way national states have enforced these clauses in order to 
establish whether a relation can be drawn between the national attitudes towards CBC 
and the national implementing measures of the EGTC Regulation. 
 
If we consider the case of federal states as Germany and Belgium, there is no mention of 
possible barring intervention of the national state because of national interest 
interferences.  
 
Such a broad limitation is also excluded in those national legal orders whose territorial 
units enjoy only administrative powers. For example, both the Portuguese and the 
French156 national enforcement acts empower the national authorities to prohibit the 
participation of a Portuguese or a French subnational unit in an EGTC provided that it 
acts beyond its internal competences or against international agreements (not foreign 
policy) concluded by the national state. 
 
In both Italian157 and Spanish158 acts of EGTC Regulation enforcement the national 
authorities are provided with a wide margins of discretion in denying the authorisation 
                                               
155 It should be noted that the two provisions are framed according to a different wordings. Art. 13 use 
the expression ―may prohibit‖,  thus making clear that it is a possibility not an obligation for M. States to 
prohibit EGTC activity in case this is in breach of public interest, public policy, etc. On the contrary, the 
wording of art. 4.3 (―M. State […] shall approve‖) may suggest that the grounds for not approving 
members participation in an EGTC are required by the EGTC regulation itself and this applies even to 
public policy and public interest grounds, no matter if these conditions are explicitly mentioned by the 
national enforcement provisions. However, such a reading seems to contradict the effet util of the EU law 
since it might impose a more burdensome procedure than that usually applied by the relevant M. State. 
Moreover the last indent of art. 4.3, by stating that in deciding on the perspective member‘s participation 
in the EGTC M. States may apply national rules, it seems to suggest M. States may choose to ―soften‖ the 
legal requirements for issuing the authorisation,  as listed in the EU Regulation, but they could not add 
new ones. To this extent, it may be assumed that when the national enforcement acts does not mention 
public policy or public interest as grounds for not issuing the authorisation, there is a presumption that 
these factors cannot be taken into consideration in the relevant domestic authorisation procedure. 
156 See Loi 2008-352, du 16 avril 2008, in J.O.R.F. du 17 avril 2008, qui a modifié l‘art. 1115.4 du Code 
général des Collectivités territoriales : «les collectivités territoriales […] peuvent, dans les limites de 
leurs compétences et dans le respect des engagements internationaux de la France, adhérer à […] un 
groupement de collectivités territoriales d‘un état membre de l‘UE […]». 
157 See Legge n. 88, 7 July 2009, (legge comunitaria 2008) in G.U. n. 161 of 14 July 2009, art. 46-47. 
158 See Real Decreto 37/2008, 18 January 2008, in B.O.E. n. 17, 19 January 2008, p. 4156, art. 6, c. 4. The 
relevant provisions state that the national authorities, in issuing the authorisation for the setting of an 
EGTC, should take into account the suitability of the EGTC objectives for the strengthening of the 
economic and social cohesion. The member of the prospective EGTC must also respect the division of the 
internal competences. This must be related with the preamble of the decree according to which «La 
regulación contenida en el presente decreto se justifica de modo prevalente en la competencia estatal en 
materia de relaciones internacionales, que habilita a las instituciones estatales – en este caso al gobierno 
de España – para ordenar y coordinar las actividades con relevancia externa de las Comunidades 
Autónomas – asì como de las restantes entitades territoriales – de forma que no condicionen o perjudiquen la 
 VOLUME 4       EJLS   ISSUE 1 
 201 
for a prospective EGTC. A burdensome procedure is required in order to verify that the 
establishment of the EGTC does not produce any interference with the public national 
interest or foreign policy. 
 
These findings seem to fit with the general remarks concerning the national attitudes 
towards CBC previously outlined. 
 
In national legal orders based on administrative decentralisation, the external conducts 
of local units are considered per se as unsuitable to affect the general foreign policy or 
the general public interest of the state and thus they are not grounds to be scrutinised, 
at least not prior to the establishment of the EGTC. 159 
 
On the contrary, in those legal orders structured on a strong degree of decentralization, 
whose intergovernmental relations are based on a competitive scheme and ethnic 
minorities are present along the national borders, a more cautious approach towards 
CBC institutionalisation arises and as we have seen the control is more on discretionary 
grounds.  The same does not occur in those federal legal orders where more cooperative 
intergovernmental relations apply.160 
 
A second issue to explore concerns the involvement of the State in the EGTCs. As we 
have noted, although the involvement of the state is not per se a true novelty, it seems to 
be a crucial element in strengthening the idea of a strategic and political CBC. 
                                                                                                                                            
dirección de la política exterior, de competencia exclusiva del Estado, de acuerdo con lo establecido por la 
jurisprudencia constitucional» (italics added by the author). 
159 Both Portuguese, Romanian and British national provisions provide the national authorities with the 
possibility to prohibit the activity of an EGTC established in the relevant state or to demand that its 
participating subnational entities withdraw from the EGTC whenever the activity conducted is in breach 
of national public policy or public interest. [Data provided by the Committee of Regions, The European 
grouping of territorial cooperation: state of play and prospects, (author: METIS GmbH), 2009 Luxembourg]. It 
should be noted that this possibility is framed by the EGTC Regulation according to a proportional and 
incremental framework, since before the prohibition is issued, the EGTC shall have the possibility to 
voluntarily cease the relevant activity. Moreover, the prohibition according to art. 13 occurs after the 
EGTC is established and in relation to a concrete hypothesis of breach on national interest or national 
policy. To this extent, art. 13 enforcement is less decisive than art. 3.4, in relation to which evaluations on 
the breaching of public policy or public interest by the national public authorities precede the 
establishment of the EGTC and they are not based on definite and concrete activities conducted by the 
EGTC. 
160 It is also interesting to consider what territorial level – national or regional – has been called to 
enforce domestically the EGTC Regulation. To this extent, we should recall that in those legal systems 
whose territorial units enjoy legislative competences the transposition of EU law can be a matter for both 
national and regional territorial levels, according to the division of powers dealt with by the Constitution. 
To this extent, it may be noted that whereas Germany and Belgium did not enact any national provisions 
for the enforcement of the EGTC Regulation, leaving the regional level the task of setting the relevant 
regulatory framework, both Italy and Spain have retained the power to enact the enforcement measures of 
the EGTC Regulation. The reason for that has been that in both countries the enforcement of the EU 
Regulation has been considered as falling under the foreign relation national competence, whereas both in 
Belgium and in Germany the EGTC Regulation has been considered as a matter related with the self-
government principle of the regional level and/or with the competence the regional level enjoy in order 
to regulate local units. The consequences of this different legal qualification are indeed important: 
whereas in Belgium and Germany there is no need for previous national authorisation for establishing a 
EGTC made up of regional authorities, in Italy and Spain such authorisation is required, in line with the 
idea that CBC of regional level can potentially undermine the national foreign policy.  
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By looking at the EGTCs thus far constituted, it can be noted that the national states 
which are, directly or by means of their decentralised organs, amongst the constitutive 
members of an EGTC are generally unitary states with a decentralisation of 
administrative type. This is the case of the Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai and West 
Vlanderen/Flandre-Dunkerque-Cote d‘Opale where France (and Belgium)161 are 
amongst the constitutive members; the Greater Region constituted amongst the others 
by France and Luxembourg, the Hospital de Cerdanya EGTC (France), the EGTC 
Galicia-Norte de Portugal (keeping in mind that the Comissão de coordenação e 
Desenvolvimento regional do Norte is a decentralised organ of Portugal). 
 
Among the above-mentioned EGTCs, the Hospital de Cerdanya EGTC has the most 
focus tailored objective: to create a cross-border organisation for the constitution and 
subsequent management of an acute-care hospital for all patients in Cerdanya and 
Capcir areas. The specific task of this ETGC is further highlighted by the limited 
number of participants (the French government and the Generalitat of Catalonia) and 
by the definite duration. 
The other EGTCs are generally structures for integrating stakeholders from different 
territorial tiers of governments162 and they are primarily aimed at being coordination 
policy instruments.163 
 
We can infer that the direct involvement of the state in the EGTC structure is favoured 
when the relevant state is a unitary state with an administrative type of 
decentralisation, which has displayed in the past increasing attention towards CBC 
                                               
161 Obviously, the case of Belgium is different. Its participation in the two mentioned EGTC may be due 
as a consequence of the France participation, as a way to guarantee a sort of institutional equilibrium in 
the EGTCS themselves. 
162 The West Vlaanderen/Fiandre-Dunkerque-Côte d‘Opale EGTC is made up of national states (France 
and Belgium), the Flemish Region and the French Région Nord-Pas-de-Calais; French and Belgian meso-
territorial units (French department and Western Flemish province) and inter-municipal association; the 
EGTC Eurométropole – Lille – Kortrijk – Tournai, constituted in January 2008, is made up or 
representatives of the two national states, of representatives of the regional level (Flemish Region, 
Walloon region and French speaking community and the Région Nord-Pas-de-Calais), representatives of 
the meso-territorial level (French Département du Nord and Provinces of Western Flanders and of 
Nainaut) and of associations of local territorial units; the EGTC –Interreg ―Programme Grande Région‖ 
is made up with national states (Luxembourg, France – by means of the Préfet de la Région Lorraine), 
regional units enjoying legislative powers (the German Länder of the Sarre and Rhenanie Palatinat, the 
Belgian French and German speaking communities and the Walloon region), regional units enjoying 
administrative powers (the French Région Lorraine) and French meso-territorial units (Départements de 
la Meuse et de la Moselle). A different framework composition characterises the Galicia – Norte de 
Portugal EGTC which is a tightly-focused geographical cooperation with only two partner regions (C.A. 
de Galicia and Comissão de coordenação e Desenvolvimento regional do Norte). All data are available at 
the website of the Committee of Regions: http://portal.cor.europa.eu. 
163 The ―Interreg Programme Grande Région‖ EGTC has been constituted with the sole aim of being the 
managing body of the Interreg IV A 2007-2013. Thus, its objective seems to be quite focus-tailored. 
However, in consideration of the long-established history of CBC in the region, according to a study 
conducted by the CoR, the EGTC ―is above all considered as an instrument for the further 
institutionalisation of the cross-border cooperation of the members. The establishment of the EGTC of 
the Greater region is perceived as a step towards the macroregion‘s integration. The Greater Region has 
managed to successfully apply for EU funds, so the EGTC is expected to exert a stronger influence on the 
members themselves than on the third parties‖. See Committee of Regions, The European grouping of 
territorial cooperation: state of play and prospects, (author: METIS GmbH), 2009 Luxembourg, 100. 
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conducted by its territorial units. The national state assumes the role of political 
coordinator by means of its decentralised territorial organs. It participates in the EGTC 
when the latter has strategic importance both for the territorial scale concerned or the 
project itself. 164 An explanation for this may also rely on the fact that the bordering 
foreign counterparts are usually ‗strong‘ subnational units, enjoying legislative powers 
and economic resources, and because of that they are likely to acquire a leading and 
influential position in the cooperation that needs to be counterbalanced. 
 
Thus, the interplay between the supranational (notably EU) legal forces and the 
national regulatory dimension can lead to an uneven development of the CBC European 
law. In fact, the strategic political dimension of CBC – entailing multilevel territorial 
participation, CBC institutionalisation of unlimited duration, made up of large territorial 
units enjoying strong powers and which pursues general coordinating aims – is more 
likely to occur in those countries, where regional level play influential roles and the 
intergovernmental relations are framed according to cooperative scheme. Because of 
that, the bordering countries which are based on decentralisation of administrative type 
(France, relevant CEE countries) will probably play a more activist role by participating 
directly in the EGTC.   
 
The case is different in those countries where vertical relations are more competitive 
based and the presence of ethnic minorities located along the borders may render CBC 
an issue of national concern (Spain, Italy, Austria – in this case as an indirect 
consequence of the German speaking minority set in Italy along the border with 
Austria).  In such a situation, it is likely that a more suspicious attitude of the national 
state towards regional CBC and its institutionalisation will emerge. From a normative 
point of view this means the authorisation procedures will be based on political 
evaluations of concepts such as public policy or public interest and the requirements 
concerning the competences can be more strictly scrutinised in order to avoid the risk of 
a too political form of CBC institutionalisation (the case of Euroregione Alpi 
Mediterraneo well illustrates the case). At the same time, in these contexts the direct 
involvement of the state in an EGTC is more difficult to put in place: such a move might 
be seen as a threat to the regional self-government rights. A third approach is likely to 
emerge: it consists in favouring CBC institutionalization when this is functional to 
pursue clear objectives rather than being conceived as a too vague form of political 
cooperation. The mentioned cases of the Hospital de Cerdanya and of the Brenner 
Corridor Platform seem to support the view. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
164 See Laurent Malo, ‗Le contrôle administratif de la coopération transfrontalière‘, in Carlos Fernandez 
de Casadevante Romani (ed.), L’État et la coopération transfrontalière (Bruylant, 2007), 131-168, at 136: 
―D‘une logique de méfiance, caractérisée par des contrôles visant à empêcher, les autorités étatiques sont 
aujourd‘hui passées à une logique d‘encadrement, dans le bus de garantir la cohérence et la sécurité 
juridiques de l‘action extérieure nationale, qu‘elle soit le fait de l‘Etat ou des collectivités territoriales‖. 
